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W. GORDON JOHNSTON- THE GOOD LIFE

W. GORDON JOHNSTON
1903- 1958
The following pages contain a memorial to Dean W. Gordon Johnston who died suddenly at Boulder, Colorado, on April 25, 1958. Dean
Johnston served the University of Denver College of Law both faithfully
and brilliantly as a law professor for twenty-six years and as dean of
the law college for over ten years. But this was only one side of his rich
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and varied service to his profession and his community. Because no one
person ever can really know all the facets of a personality so rarely gifted
yet so versatile as was his, the editors have asked a few of his myriad
friends to contribute here their thoughts on some aspects of his life.
In addition, 'this issue of DICTA is dedicated with warm affection
to the memory of Dean Johnston. He has many more enduring memorials. He himself, by his life and example, by his kindness, tact and
wit, has built his own memorials. No perishable pyramids are these.
He chose as their sites the immortal minds of men and built of the indestructible stuff of ideas and ideals. All of us whose lives have been
enriched by having known Gordon Johnston know full well that his
kindly and uplifting influence lives on.
But for those who may not have known Dean Johnston, and for
those who knew him in only one or two of his many activities, it is
hoped that these pages will make him better known.
THE EDITORS.

W.

GORDON JOHNSTON -

LEGAL EDUCATOR

Gordon Johnston's contribution to the advancement of legal education at the national level cannot be adequately measured in words alone.
Nor could any extended recital, let alone a brief one such as this, do
justice to the impact of his friendly and understanding personality,
his discerning judgment, and his gracious willingness, on those many
colleagues with whom he worked so unstintingly in improving the standards of training for the bar. As Acting Adviser to the Section oh-Legal
Education of the American Bar Association in 1941 and 1942 he served
admirably and well. As a member of the Executive Committee of the
Association of American Law Schools in 1952, and as a member or
chairman of many of that Association's other important committees
during his twenty-six years as a legal educator, he will be always acknowledged as an effective leader and a generous participant. He was co-host
to the law school association for its December 1951 meeting in Denver,
and the officers and representatives who attended will long remember
the fine program and hospitable entertainment arranged for them.
Gordon Johnston's high principles, his executive ability, his scholarship,
and his outstanding qualities as a teacher, have justly earned him an
enduring niche in legal education's Hall of Fame.
SHELDEN D. ELLIOTT
Director, Institute of Judicial Administration, Professor of Law,
New York University School of
Law.
W.

GORDON

JOHNSTON-COLLEAGUE

AND

FRIEND

Those of us who were fortunate enough to be associated with Gor-

don as fellow faculty members of the University of Denver College of
Law and as personal friends enjoyed a rare and happy association with
one in whom were merged, to an unusual degree, those qualities of genuine humanity and intellectual endowments which will make this association a cherished memory as long as we live. For Gordon was exceptional in these relationships, just as he was outstanding in his activities
in every field of his many interests.
As the administrator of the affairs of the College of Law he enjoyed
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the complete respect of his faculty and, what was, I am sure, even more
important to him, he had their great affection and loyalty. He expected
much of his faculty, but he gave much of himself-perhaps, as it turned
out, too much. His reprimand, when deserved, was sharp, but I do not
believe that it was ever given except after long deliberation and thorough
investigation of the facts, and then reluctantly, for it was plain to us all
that our affection for him was returned many fold. He had confidence
in our interests in the affairs of the school and if he ever doubted the
sincerity of our opinions and of our reasons for them we were never
permitted to know it. But his sound judgment, based upon his keen intellect and his years of experience, furnished a reliable base for our discussions, and it was only rarely that we failed to reach a unanimous
decision. His desire to preserve and promote the welfare of the faculty
was always apparent to us and it is due to this fact that the faculty of
the College of Law, through all the years, has remained a closely knit
body, without jealousies and dedicated to the task of constantly improving and developing the school, so that today the long hoped for ideal
of still greater service is about to be realized in a new law center. Gordon
cherished the hope of completing this project and we feel a pang in
our hearts in the knowledge that this cannot be. He will be missed and
his place can never be filled completely, for his personality will be
missing.
Gordon, the friend, will be remembered among a wide and varied
group of people, drawn from those who had succeeded greatly in life,
from those who were marked for success and from those whose contributions to life have been of a less brilliant sort. It is significant, however,
that we all feel the same sense of the loss of a kindly and valued friend
who saw no task too great if its performance would help someone else.
His courtesy and kindness were unfailing. I have never known him to
make anyone uncomfortable before others. He was incapable of doing
so, for he loved people. His interests were broad and one felt at home
with him immediately. In conversation he was brilliant and yet he was
endowed with a certain humility and a fine talent of giving his entire
attention to the immediate occasion. He had an easy grace in a group
of any size, and this made conversation a pleasure and led it in far ranging courses. But with all of his gregariousness and love of man he could
also be the quiet companion who delighted to share in the beauties of
a great symphony, a fine poem or a work of art.
His candor and ingeniousness were disarming and always produced
a feeling of warmth in one, a feeling that here was a fellow human
being who, for all of his great talents, had those same little human virtues and faults that endear us to each other. Sensitive himself, he recoiled
from injuring the feelings of others and I have known him to undergo
an agony of spirit when he believed that he had unintentionally offended
a friend, a colleague or a student. The faults in others he easily explained or overlooked altogether, but he was extremely critical of his
own. I think that he had a great deal of the spirit of turning the other
cheek.
This is, then, briefly, the image of Gordon as my colleague and
friend. I hope that I have spoken for others, too.
VANCE R. DiTrMAN, JR.
Professor of Law
University of Denver College of
Law
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We who, as practicing lawyers, have known Gordon Johnston as a
member of Bar Associations and related groups, cherish vivid memories
of another brilliant facet of this many sided man. His sound judgment
and wise counsel in Bar Association matters was founded upon his
four years of practice in Chicago before he came to Denver. He had
been admitted to the Colorado Bar in 1938. It can be sincerely said that
he never lost the "common touch" of the practicing lawyer. When the
grace and depth of learning of the educator were added to such a foundation, an uncommon person evolved. Gordon was most active in
American Bar Association affairs where he had served as adviser to the
Section on Legal Education. He was vitally interested in Colorado Bar
Association work as a member of its Board of Governors, including
active participation in a meeting on the very day of his passing. He
worked conscientiously and faithfully on Denver Bar Association committees, many of which required real effort and offered little or no
glamour or public notice. His presidency of the Denver Law Club was
characterized by the wit and charm which we all associated with him.
His inimitable blend of learning and wit, displayed in the prominent
parts he took in Law Club shows at Colorado Bar Association conventions, will long be remembered.
The practicing lawyers of Colorado will sorely miss the man who
could be so wise and sound in his counsel and advice, and who so gracefully leavened it with humor and warmth.
ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT
Immediate Past President
Denver Bar Association

W.

GORDON JOHNSTON -

DEVOTED Civic LEADER

Except for parents themselves, it is the dedicated, able teacher more
than any other member of our free society who is responsible for the
kind of country we live in, for it is the teacher who moulds and shapes
children at the potter's wheel into decent, useful, educated citizens. In
law schools and other colleges it is essential that students be taught not
only "book learning" but also a depth of understanding of and perception of humanity. It is vital that each of us learn he has duties as
well as privileges.
Such a teacher was AV. Gordon Johnston, Dean of the University
of Denver College of Law. First as a lawyer, then in succession as instructor, professor and dean he ably sought to uphold the highest traditions of not only the legal profession but also of the teaching profession.
He rendered service above self by practicing outside the classroom what
he expressed as a part of his teaching and administration creed at college.
He believed in active participation in civic and professional activities
by teachers not only because of possible interest therein but also because
he was convinced that in so doing teachers continued to make the world
a better place for all of us.
His varied interests in fields other than civic and in legal and teaching services are not within the scope of this brief memorial, his devotion
to civic affairs is. By "civic" in fact is meant those "public" or outside
activities that show how this scholar was one who swam the stream of
life with the best of men.
Dean Johnston served well his community on the Budget Commit-

MAY-JUNE,

1958

DICTA

tee of the Denver Community Chest and as a member of the Board of
Trustees of the Rocky Mountain Council on Family Relations. He was
elected to Phi Beta Kappa as an undergraduate at the University of Iowa
and served as the first president of the University of Denver chapter; he
always retained an active interest in Delta Tau Delta, his college social
fraternity, and was active locally and nationally in Omicron Delta Kappa.
In the latter organization he first became a member while a student at
the University of Iowa. He believed in its service to American youth
and continued actively in it until his death. In 1938 he affiliated with
its Alpha Pi Circle at the University of Denver. He became Deputy
of Province VI in 1945 and held that office until 1951. He became a
member of the General Council in 1949, of the Executive Committee of
the General Council in 1951, served on many committees and as National President in 1951-53 and 1953-55. He received that organization's
Distinguished Service Award and was admitted to its Laureate Circle
in 1957.
By any standard of measurement Dean Johnston was a devoted
civic leader. We know that the world is a better place for his enlightened conduct and projection into the public affairs of mankind. He
knew that men cannot live by bread alone.
LEONARD V. B. SUTTON
Associate Justice
Colorado Supreme Court

W.

GORDON JOHNSTON -

TEACHER,

MENTOR AND

FRIEND

To us, the students of the University of Denver College of Law,
Dean Gordon Johnston was an outstanding teacher, a respected advisor
and, most important of all, a true and unselfish friend who had our
interests at heart. In him the qualities of a successful administrator
were blended with the finest attributes of genuine understanding. These
sterling characteristics permeated his relationship with the student body
and earned him wide recognition as one of the friendliest and best-liked
law deans in America.
We cannot forget his inspiring speeches, his ready wit, his refreshing sense of humor and his heartwarming demeanor. Nor can we forget
his wide participation in student affairs, academic and social. He was
especially fond of Derby Day and would enter fully into the gaiety and
frolic. When the students arranged for a luncheon he took time and
effort to secure outstanding speakers. His desire to draw closer to us
reflected itself in his policy of encouraging student government. His
relationship with us was one of trust and confidence. We know that he
recognized the gratitude and the thanks we gave him.
Despite his many activities, he found time to talk with us individually, to listen to our problems, to give freely of his advice and help. None
of us was unimportant to him. We were his special concern and he
imparted the many benefits of his wisdom and experience. Such was
the nature of our relationship. For these and many untold reasons,
Gordon Johnston shall always be remembered by his students.
EDWARD S. BARLOCK

Editor-in-Chief, DICTA
ROBERT

D.

JACKSON

President, College of Law Student
Senate
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MAN OF ARTS AND LETTERS

We here commemorate Gordon Johnston, a man of more than ordinary parts. Among his many traits were an acute ear for verbal cadence
as well as for musical tone, and an accurate and discriminating eye for the
artistic and beautiful. These senses and enthusiasms impelled his active
and devoted participation in a great number and variety of artistic and
cultural civic enterprises.
That he was also a scholar, a teacher, an imaginative and resourceful law school advisor and administrator, we all know. But there are
others who have been these things. Even more unusual was his sense of
humor and sense of nonsense, perhaps well illustrated by the following
little reminiscence. The perpetrators of one of the Law Club shows
needed a man of bearing, of cultured voice, a patrician stage presence
and an unimpeachable standing as a patron of the arts. But such a person
also had to possess a far less usual trait-an enthusiastic readiness to outrage his own dignity, for his task was to serve as the haughty and pedantic master of ceremonies in introducing a show which commenced
with the dishearteningly sincere singing of a well known aria. Once the
audience had resigned itself to an evening of unrelieved tedium while
the Law Club amateurs were apparently going to attempt to produce
good music, it became time for a stagehand to shove a meringue pie in
Dick Shaw's face.
All who were present will gleefully remember Gordon's wickedly
highbrow and contrivedly tedious introductory remarks to these antic
foolishments.
Hardly the proper demeanor for an ordinary law school dean. But
if there was one thing he was not, it was an ordinary law school dean. A
man who loved Shakespeare as he loved Blackstone, and to whom
Bach was as important as Marshall, who spent today on the Legal Aid
Society, tomorrow on Allied Arts (being president of both), or whose
service was nationally known in the Councils of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, as well as the Central City
Festival, the Symphony Society or the Association of American Law
Schools; Dean, fraternity president, naval officer, amateur actor, author,
poet, pianist, violinist, and above all a devoted husband and father and
a warm friend-yes, he was indeed a man of many parts. We will miss
him.
PETER

H.

HOLME, JR.

Attorney at Law
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W.Gordon Johnston-Poet
Dean Johnston left
(Editor's note:
many of his ideas in the form of hunHe began writing
dreds of poems.
poetry while still in his early teens,
and continued throughout his life. The
following poem, written a few years
ago, was found on his desk the morning following his death.)

So little we know! How very small
Our true discernment -all
That one can do, when act he must,
Is what seems best - and trust! Trust there is goodness, purpose- and,
Surely, One at hand,
Who leads him, guides him, wisely knows
Whither, and why, he goes.
Count life but a means of gain!
Both in joy and pain,
In sorrow, doubt, and faith. - At last,
Life here being past.
One may see plain the half-guessed truth
In the soul's new youth,
When - truly, life was not in vain!God shall Himself explain.
The long night ends; now breaks the gentle dawn.
The breezes softly sough.
The world is still.
The bitter protest in my heart is gone.
I am submissive now.
It is God's will.
GORDON JOHNSTON
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CHOICE 'OF THE APPLICABLE LAW INCOLORADO
By

GORDON C. SMITH

Gordon C. Smith received his B.A. degree
from the University of Colorado in 1947
and 'his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law
School in 1951. He is an attorney in the
Office of the General Counsel of the
United States Department of Agriculture
and a part time Instructor at the University of Denver College of Law. Mr. Smith is
a member of the Colorado, Denver,
American, and Federal Bar Associations.
Recently he was awarded a scholarship
for study this summer at The Hague Academy of International Law at the Peace
Palace in The Hague, Netherlands.
Whenever an action-whether based on contract or tort-has substantial elements in two or more states having different local laws, it
becomes necessary to determine which of these laws shall govern the
rights and obligations of the parties. The ensuing problems incident to
deciding which law shall govern comprise a great portion of that branch
1
of the law known as conflict of laws or private international law.
Prior to the nineteenth century this area of the law was quite unimportant in both England and the United States;' therefore precedent is
relatively sparse. Furthermore, the precedent that does exist is confused not only by the number of divergent choice of law theories employed in different jurisdictions, but by decisions handed down by the
same court advancing inconsistent theories. Confusion is especially
prevalent in cases involving a choice as to what law determines the
validity of a contract.' Although there exists some divergence of rules
relative to determining what law governs a tort action,' the choice of
law rules of tort liability are relatively uniform when compared with
those of contracts.
The purpose of this article is twofold-first, to enunciate the diverse
choice of law theories concerning both contracts and torts which are
presently employed, and second, to review analytically the Colorado
decisions in relation to these various theories.
CONTRACT CHOICE OF LAW THEORIES

When a court is confronted with a contract connected with two or
1 Both designations have been criticized. The term "conflict of laws" is criticized
because it suggests a struggle between two laws for mastery and because it is too
narrow in scope. It has been suggested that "concord of laws" or "choice of laws"
would be more appropriate. The term "private international law" has been criticized
because the rules are not a private species of the body of rules which prevails between
one nation and another as they should be if the term international is taken in its
accepted legal meaning. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 5 (3d ed. 1949).
2 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 2-6 (2d ed. 1951). Professor Stumberg states that
the first complete work in English dealing with Conflict of Laws was by Story whose
treatise was published in 1834. Having before him but few cases and consequently no
common-law tradition, he turned to the works of continental jurists basing his conclusions largely upon the theories of the Dutch jurists.
3 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 321 (3d ed. 1949).
4 Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
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more jurisdictions, and it determines that some question relating to the
contract is one of substance, the court must decide upon the course it will
pursue in choosing the substantive law to be applied.' The question
which has arisen most often and has proved the most troublesome is
what law shall govern the validity of a contract. At least the following
five diverse choice of law theories concerning validity of contracts have
been employed by Anglo-American courts:
1)

The Law of the Place of Contracting (lex loci contractus). The

rule that the place of making or executing governs the validity of a contract has been adopted by the Restatement' and has the support of a
number of writers.' Critics of this rule stress the difficulties inherent in
determining the place of making and point out that this place may
have no substantial relation to the agreement.' For example, a contract
to be performed in Wyoming by Wyoming parties might happen to be
prepared and executed in Denver, Colorado, perhaps in the office of a
Denver law firm. Although the contract, after it has been executed, has no
connection with Colorado, according to this choice of law theory Colorado law would govern its validity. Professor Stumberg states that only
a minority of the American states have professed to follow the place of
making rule.'
2) The Law of the Place of Performance (lex loci solutionis)."
This theory has been advanced on the ground that the place of performance usually is of greater significance to the contract than the place
of making and that the parties can thus be presumed to have intended
the place of performance to govern the validity. However, difficulty
arises when several places of performance are named or when no place
of performance is named."
5 As a general rule matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum.
See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 585; see also Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 134
(2d ed. 1951).
6 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 332 (1934). Id. § 311 comment d provides that a
contract is deemed to have been made where the "principal event" necessary to
make it a binding obligation took place. See also Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 107
(3d ed. 1949). The "principal event" mentioned in the Restatement seens to be synonymous with Goodrich's "last act."
7 Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 79,
194, 260 (1910); see also 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 332.4 (1935) and Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws 323 (3d ed. 1949).
s Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 164-66 (1943).
9 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 226 (2d ed. 1951).
10 In a general summary written in 1910, Professor Beale gave a plurality of states
as applying the place of performance rule. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity
of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 79, 194, 260 (1910).
11 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 232-34 (2d ed. 1951).
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3) The Law Intended by the Parties."
The English courts have
sought to apply the law or laws by which the parties intended, or may
fairly be presumed to have intended, the contract to be governed. Often
where the contract expressly states the parties' intention that it shall be
governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, their intention will be
effectuated by the courts if the chosen law has some meaningful connection with the contract."'

4) The Law Which Upholds the Contract." Under this theory
courts look to either the place of contracting or of performance and
sometimes to some other place having a substantial connection with the
contract and apply whichever law will validate the agreement. This
rule is often used in commercial contracts requiring interest payments
which are usurious and invalid under the laws of one or several of the
jurisdictions connected with the loan. The rationale, of course, is that
the parties intended to make a valid contract and that this intent should
be effectuated.
5) The "Center of Gravity" Theory. This rule has also been termed
the "grouping of contacts," "most vital connection," "accumulation of
contact points" and also the "proper law" of the contract. The latter
term, however, has been used to designate the English rule that the law
presumably intended by the parties governs a contract." Textwriters
are agreed that this method as employed by the English courts to find
the "proper law" in order to give effect to the intention of the parties
is actually an attempt to find the place most vitally connected with the
contract."
This theory is the most recent to be utilized by the American courts.
It does not appear as one of the choice of law theories in earlier legal
treatises; in fact, it is not mentioned in Professor Strumberg's 1951 treatise."
Under this theory the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive
the parties' intention or the place of contracting or performance or the
law which upholds the contract, lay emphasis upon the law of the place
which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute. The
theory has been criticized as being merely a device for reconciling cases
12 In numerical strength, according to Professor Beale's summary in 1910, the
states following this rule rank second. This rule was probably most frequently followed by the United States Supreme Court prior to the decision of Erie R. R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) when federal courts were free to apply their own notions
of conflict of laws in cases of diversity of citizenship. See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws
234 (2d ed. 1951).

11 For a general analysis of this theory of law see Note, Conflict of Laws; "Party

Autonomy" in Contracts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 553 (1957). The note concludes by stating:
"Theoretically there appear to be no sound objections to permitting contracting
parties to select the law governing the validity of their contract if (1) the chosen
law has some meaningful connection with the contract, (2) the choice of law is freely
arrived at on a basis of- equal bargaining power, and (3) compelling public policy
considerations,
particularly
as embodied in
local
protective
statutes, do
not
dictate applicaton of the law of the forum." Id. at 576.
14 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 111 (3d ed. 1949). See also Stumberg, Conflict of
Laws 237-40 (2d ed. 1951).
15 See Morris and Cheshire, The Proper Law of a Contract in Conflict of Laws,
56 L.Q. Rev. 320 (1940).
16 See Cheshire, Private International Law 199-204 (4th ed. 1952).
17 Although Stumberg does not mention this theory as a separate theory he in
effect discusses it under the theory of "Intention of the parties." See Stumberg,
Conflict of Laws 234-36 (2d ed. 1951).
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actually decided according to more traditional choice of law rules and
as a means of granting judges an excessively broad discretion in weighing various contacts. 8 On the other hand, this theory has been praised
because it gives to the place having the most interest in the problem
paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual
context, thus allowing the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction
most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation."
The case of Auten v. Auten, ° a recent New York decision employing this theory, merits attention, principally because it has received so
much comment,1 but also because it might well pave the way for other
courts, including those of Colorado, to utilize this comparatively new approach. The "center of gravity" theory was applied in the Auten case
under the following circumstances: The parties, husband and wife,
were married in England and lived there with their two children for
fourteen years, when the husband allegedly deserted his wife and come to
the United States. The wife came to New York for the purpose of making
a separation agreement. The agreement entered into by the two parties
obligated the husband to pay to a trustee for his wife, who was to
return to England, fifty pounds per month for the support of herself
and the children, and obligated the wife not to sue in any action relating
to their separation. The wife returned to England and subsequently
is

Note, 40 Cornell L.Q. 772 (1955).

19 Note, 3 Utah L. Rev. 490 (1953).
2d 246 (1954).
20 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.IR.
21 The Auten case has been commented on in various notes, e.g., 24 Fordham L.
Rev. 268 (1955); 40 Cornell L.Q. 772 (1955); 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 381 (1955).
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brought an action in an English court for separation, charging the husband with adultery. The present action was brought in New York to
recover installments due for support and maintenance under the agreement. The issue was whether the wife's commencement of the English
action constituted a repudiation of the separation agreement and effected a forfeiture of her right to any payments under it. The lower
court concluded that New York law was to be applied and dismissed
the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the English
law rather than New York law applied. The latter court, concluding
that England had all the truly significant contacts, stated:
"By stressing the significant contacts, it enables the court,
not only to reflect the relative interests of the several jurisdictions involved but also to give effect to the probable intention
of the parties and consideration to whether
one rule or the
22
other produces the best practical result.11
It should be noted that the validity of the contract was not in
question, but rather whether there was a breach. The court could have
relied solely on the conventional rule that matters of performance and
breach of a contract are governed by the law of the place of performance, because so far as the wife's performance was concerned, the place
was England. The court, however, chose to enunciate and follow the
"center of gravity" theory in deciding the applicable law. The Auten
case was not the first case to utilize this theory2 ' nor has it been the last,
for subsequent to this case the theory has been employed by the New
York state courts22 as well as by the federal courts sitting in New York."
It is generally conceded by the federal courts in New York that the New
York Court of Appeals has adopted this theory. Thus a federal district
court in Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Simon2 7 stated:
"Abandoning unitary formulas such as 'the place of contracting' or 'the place of performance,' the New York Court of
Appeals has adopted the 'grouping of contacts' theory ....
This
approach requires the application of 'the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately connected with the outcome of the particular litigation.' At the same time this doctrine enables the
court, not only to reflect the relative interests of the several jurisdictions involved . . . but also to give effect to the probable intention of the parties and consideration to whether one rule or
the other produces the best practical result."'"
Much more could have been written about the various choice of
law theories presently employed by the courts, 2 1 but this cursory back124 N.E.2d at 102.
23 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 370 (1934) states: "The law of the place of
performance determines whether a breach has occurred."
24 The "center of gravity" theory was -employed in New York in several cases
prior to the Auten case, e.g., Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.EI.2d 424
(1953); Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp, 4 (Sup. Ct.
1936).
25 See e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 147 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
26 See e.g., Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Industries, 239 F.2d 716
(2d Cir. 1956); Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F.Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
27 151 F.Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
2S Id. at 411.
29 In addition to these five theories, courts have also emphasized the law of the
place where one or both of the contracting parties are domiciled, or in cases involving
real estate the law of the situs. For a recent discussion of choice of law rules in
Russia see Pisar, Soviet Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Transactions,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1957).
22
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ground will suffice to present an analytical review of the Colorado
decisions.
CONTRACT

CHOICE

OF

LAW

IN

COLORADO

The first reported Colorado case involving the choice of law of a
contract was Roop v. Delahaye" decided in 1874 by the Supreme Court
of Colorado Territory. The action, instituted in Colorado, was based on
a promisory note which the defendant claimed was invalid under the
laws of Iowa where made. The Court apparently conceded that Iowa
law would govern the validity of the note, but held that the defense
that the note was made in a foreign state, upon a consideration which
was void under a law of that state, should be specially pleaded.
Another early case, decided in 1887, was that of Hochstadter v.
Hays," which involved an action for the price of goods sold to a firm
in Missouri, of which the defendant, a married woman, was a member.
The law in Missouri at that time held that a married woman's contracts
were valid only as against her separate estate in equity. The Colorado law
was to the contrary-that a married woman could sue and be sued as a
feme sole. But the court applied the Missouri law and held that a personal
judgment against the defendant could not be sustained. The~court said:
" [I] t is a familiar principle that the nature, validity, obligation and interpretation of contracts are to be governed by
the lex loci, and we are of the opinion that there is a defect of
30 2 Colo. 307 (1874).
31 11 Colo. 118, 17 Pac. 2S9 (1887).
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obligation in the contract sued upon which forbids judgment
asked for. What the defendant undertook to do within her legal
capacity to contract constitutes the obligation of her contract.
• . . Substantially she undertook that her separate estate then
existing might be subjected to the payment of the debt in case
of default. This was the extent of the obligation of her contract.
And this is all that the plaintiffs are entitled to ask any court,
whether in Missouri or elsewhere, to enforce. We cannot change
the nature of the contract or add to its obligations.""
Wolf v. Burke " involved an action on a parol contract, made and
to be performed in Idaho, for the sale of mining land located in Idaho,
The Colorado statute of frauds provided that every contract for the sale
of land or any interest therein "shall be void unless the contract or some
note or memorandum thereof is in writing."" The Colorado Supreme
Court held that the law of Idaho, where the contract was made, determined the validity of the contract. Some courts have held that a statute
of frauds relates to procedure" rather than substance, in which case the
law of the forum governs; but the Wolf case definitely classifies the
statute of frauds as substantive.
Although the Colorado decisions mentioned thus far, and also
others" seem to favor the first theory discussed under the heading of
law of the place of contracting, these decisions do not actually reject the
other theories. The contests in these cases were all between the law of the
place of contracting and the law of the forum, rather than between the
law of place of contracting and the law of the place of performance, that
intended by parties, that which upholds the contract, or that place which
has the most significant contacts. However, in Cockburn v. Kinsley"
the court was directly confronted with the problem of whether the
validity of a contract should be governed by the law of the place where
the contract was made, by the law of the place of performance, or by
the law intended by the parties. In this case, a promissory note was
executed in Colorado by the president and secretary of an Arizona
mining corporation doing business in Mexico. The note was payable
in Minnesota. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the liability of
the directors was to be determined by the law of Colorado, the place
of making, which law the Court said was impressed on the note when
made. The court expressly rejected the view that the law of Minnesota,
the place of performance, should determine the contract's validity.
The court stated:
"The law is quite plain that where the contract is made in
32 Id.

at 123, 17 Pac. at 292.

33 18 Colo. 264, 32 Pac. 427, 19 L.R.A. 792 (1893).
34 Gen. Stat. 1883, § 1517.
35 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 88 (3d ed. 1949); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 141
(2d ed. 1951).
36 E.g., Ancient Order of the Pyramids v. Dixon, 45 Colo. 95, 100 Pac. 427 (1909);
Sullivan v. German Nat'l Bank, 18 Colo. App. 99, 70 Pac. 162 (1902); Des Moines Life
Ass'n v. Owen, 10 Colo. App. 131, 50 Pac. 210 (1897).
37 25 Colo. App.
89, 135 Pac. 1112 (1913).
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one state and performance is to be in another, the law of the
place of performance governs with reference to all questions concerning the performance, whether the suit be brought in that
place or not . . . and that the law of the place where the suit
is brought governs in all questions concerning the remedy . . .
and that the law of the place where the contract is made governs
all questions concerning the validity of the note and the capacity
of the makers thereof." 8
The court also apparently rejected the theory that the law intended by
the parties governs the validity, as the court in quoting Wharton on
Conflict of Laws, sec. 427, states that a contract's "governing law should
be determined by a fixed rule not dependent upon the intention of
the parties.""
It cannot be denied that Colorado favors the theory that the law
of the place of making governs the validity of a contract. But it should
not be concluded that in all cases this theory is followed, for in McKay v.
Belknap Savings Bank "° the court appeared to follow the theory that the
law intended by the parties or possibly the law which upholds the contract governs. In this case, a note was made in Colorado to bear interest
at 8%, but in the event of default, interest was to be at the rate of 12%.
The note was payable in New Hampshire where no higher rate than 6%
was allowable. The Supreme Court, holding that the lower court properly allowed interest at the increased rate, stated:
"The law upon this proposition is stated by Beach on Modern Law of Contracts, Vol. 1, sec. 606, as follows: 'When at the
place of contract, the rate of interest differs from that of the
place of payment, the parties may stipulate for either rate, and
the contract will govern, the parties having the right of election
as to the law of which place their contract is to be governed.. ....
The decision, however, would have reached the same result had
the court applied the law of the place of making. The McKay case is
cited in Baxter v. Beckwith" wherein a note made and payable in Iowa
was held to be governed by the laws of Iowa as to an interest provision
valid in Iowa but invalid in Colorado. The court seemed to base its
ruling on the "place of making" theory, but the court also stated:
"The parties may legally stipulate the payment of interest
according to the laws of the state where the instrument is made,
or according to the laws of the place of payment, and the rate
thus agreed upon may be recovered, although it may be illegal
under the laws of the other state.""
The McKay and Baxter cases" indicate that Colorado approves the
theory that the law intended by the parties (or the law which upholds
the contract) governs the validity of a contract. However, it should be
emphasized that the holding in the McKay case and the dictum of the
Baxter case apply only to usury situations. Whether the court will exId.
39 Id.
40 27
41 Id.
42 25
43 Id.
38

at 93, 135 Pac. at 1113.
at 95, 135 Pac. at 1114.
Colo. 50, 59 Pac. 745 (1899).
at 56, 59 Pac. at 747.
Colo. App. 322, 137 Pac. 901 (1914).
at 325, 137 Pac. at 902.

4 Accord, Eccles v. Herrick, 15 Colo. App. 350, 62 Pac. 1040 (1900).
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tend the McKay holdings to situations other than those involving interest is, of course, a matter of speculation.
The cases decided in the federal courts of the District of Colorado have given effect to the law of the place of making, but such decisions do not expressly reject the other theories. In American Crystal
Sugar Company v. Nicholas" the federal court applied the law of Utah
to determine the effect of the parol evidence rule on a contract made in
Utah, but there was no actual contest between the different choice of law
theories. Gossard v. Gossard," also a federal case, involved the legal
effect of a contract made in Illinois. The court in this case stated:
"The law of the place where a contract is made governs
its nature, validity, and interpretation, unless it appears that
the parties when entering into the contract
intended to be
7
bound by the law of some other place."'
Although the court did not follow the theory that the law intended
by the parties governs, as there was no need for such in the Gossard
case, it appears from the above statement that the court was not adverse
to the theory. There has thus far been no indication that the Colorado
courts would extend this theory to the "proper law" as understood by
the English decisions, that is, the law which the parties may fairly be
presumed to have intended, but on the other hand there has been no
indication that the courts would reject the theory.
It is only when the Colorado .courts are confronted with the
problem of determining the validity of a marriage contract that they
are bound by statute to employ the law of the place of contracting.
The pertinent statute of Colorado provides:
"All marriages contracted without this state, which shall
be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, shall be valid in all courts within this state. This
section shall not be construed so as to allow bigamy or polygamy
in this state.""
Spencer v. People" involved a proceeding on a petition charging

a 30-year-old husband with contributing to the deliquency of a 15-yearold minor female to whom he was married. The Colorado Supreme
Court, relying on the above-mentioned statute, held that since the mar45 124 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1941).
46 149 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1945).
47 Id. at 112.
48 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 90-1-5 (1953).
49 133 Colo. 196, 292 P.2d 971 (1956).
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riage was entered into in the state of Utah, where it was deemed valid
according to the laws of that state, the act of marriage was not an act of
delinquency. The court in Payne v. Payne" also relied on said statute in
holding that a marriage of a 16-year-old minor male, contracted in Texas
and valid under the laws of Texas, could not be annulled under the
Colorado statute making voidable all marriages wherein either party is
under the age of 18 years. 1
In contract choice of law situations, other than those involving the
validity of a marriage contract," the courts of Colorado are bound only
by the cases previously decided. It is submitted that these cases do not
actually limit the courts to any single theory. Had any one or all of the
foregoing cases, except those involving marriage contracts, been decided
under the "center of gravity" theory, the result or results would probably
have been the same. In cases following the place of making theory, the
place of making was actually the "center of gravity" of the contract. In
cases involving usury where the place of performance was applied, said
place of performance was probably the "center of gravity." Said theory
has not yet found expression in the Colorado cases, but it no doubt
will, when a particular factual situation warrants. Although the theory
might appear somewhat nebulous and perhaps even arbitrary in its
application, it can fulfill the expectations of the parties more adequately than the law of the place of making or any other single theory.
In most cases there will be no necessity for the courts to look beyond
the place of making, but where a situation arises when inequity would
result by looking only to the place of making, it is predicted that the
court would, and it is suggested that the court should, apply the
"center of gravity" theory in determining what law is to govern the
validity of a contract.
TORT CHOICE OF LAW RULES

The prevailing view as to tort liability in America is that the law
of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury."2 According to this view, it is immaterial whether the harm in
question was or was not a legal injury by the law of the forum or by the
law of the place where the actor acted." A few American courts have
refused relief where the local law was substantially different from the
foreign law, but most American courts have held that the existence of a
cause of action at the forum is determined by reference to the substantive law of the place of the wrong or tort, regardless of the local law
of the forum.5
50 121 Colo. 212, 214 P.2d 495 (1950).
95
51 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-3-1 (1
3), provides: "All marriages wherein either party
is under the age of eighteen years are hereby declared to be voidable."
52 In New York the courts even apply the "center of gravity" theory to marriage
contracts, e.g., see Anderson v. Anderson, 147 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1955), wherein
the court stated at page 355: "Moreover, all the significant factors involved in this
cause of action are in this state. Except for the marriage all essential elements of
the cause took place here: the parties met and lived in New York during their courtship; the proposal and acceptance, the representation and the actual execution of the
affidavit for the license occurred in New York. We may borrow from the field of
conflict of laws the principle of 'grounding of contacts' in which the courts apply the
law of the state which has the most significant contacts with the particular matter
involved."
53 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934). Id.
§ 377 states: "The place of

wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place."
54 Id. comment b.
65 Stumberg. Conflict of Laws 183 (2d ed. 1951).
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The rule in England is that the conduct must be wrongful under the
civil or criminal law of the place where it occurred, and also actionable
under the internal law of England. " A new approach, however, has been
advocated by Professor Morris " for both England and America. He suggests that a proper law doctrine be applied to torts similar to the proper
law doctrine as applied to the question whether the defendant is liable
for breach of contract. Professor Morris asks, "Why should we not reach
results which are socially convenient and sound by applying the proper
law doctrine to the question whether the defendant is liable for tort?""8
He states that the proper law approach intelligently applied would
furnish a much needed flexibility. He concedes that in many cases
there would be no need to look beyond the law of the place of wrong,
so long as there is no doubt where the place is. But he suggests having
a conflict rule sufficiently broad and flexible to take care of exceptional
as well as normal situations, or else formulating an entirely new rule
to deal with the exceptional situations. Otherwise, he claims, the results
will offend our common sense.
TORT CHOICE OF LAW IN COLORADO

The courts in Colorado, both state and federal, have followed the
general rule that the law of the place of the wrong determines whether
a person has sustained a legal injury. In Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co.
v. Betts," an early Colorado decision, the plaintiff sued in Colorado to
recover damages for the death of a mule killed in New Mexico by the
defendant's train. The court applied the general rule and held that the
liability of the defendant was governed by the laws of New Mexico where
the accident occurred.
The courts of Colorado also apply the law of the place of wrong in
wrongful death actions. In Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Warring,"
the husband of the plaintiff was killed in New Mexico while in the employment of the defendant railroad. He was a resident of Colorado and
his widow was appointed administratix in Colorado. She brought an
action here to recover damages for wrongful death, basing her claim on
the New Mexico statute. The court held that she was the proper person
to sue, in accordance with the New Mexico statute, although under the
wrongful death statute of Colorado the right to sue is in the heir. Stolz v.
Burlington Transportation Company," a federal case involving a wrongful death statute, held that the limitation of $5,000 in the Colorado wrongful death statute "' does not apply in the action brought in the federal
court in Colorado on a cause of action arising in Utah.
There appears not the slightest tendency to deviate from the well
accepted rule that tort liability is governed by the lex loci delicti. Had
there been any inclination to follow Professor Morris' proper law theory
of a tort, it would have no doubt found expression in the case of Pando
56 See Cheshire, Private International Law Ch. XI (3d ed. 1947)

of the English rule.
57 Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951).
58 Id. at 883.
59 10 Colo. 431, 15 Pac. 821 (1887).
60 37 Colo. 122, 86 Pac. 305 (1906).
61 178 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1949).
62 The limitation in a wrongful death action is now $25,000.
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v. Jasper.3 In this case plaintiff was injured in Kansas while riding as a
passenger in an automobile driven and owned by defendant, when the
automobile left the road and struck a pole. It appears from reading the
case that plaintiff and defendant were both residents of Colorado and
started their drive in Colorado, but happened to cross the border into
Kansas. Professor Morris would advocate that the law of Colorado
rather than Kansas would be the proper law of the tort, assuming, of
course, that the only connection with Kansas was that the injury occurred there; and as a result, Professor Morris would no doubt apply the
Colorado Guest Statute. The Colorado Supreme Court, however, stated
that plaintiff's claim was governed by the lex loci delicti, but held that
the lower court erred in admitting the Kansas Guest Statute in evidence
when it had not been pleaded.
It is predicted that the courts of Colorado will be very reluctant to
depart even slightly from the long-accepted rule that tort liability is
governed by the law of the place of wrong; however, it is suggested that
in exceptional situations the proper law of a tort as defined by Professor
Morris should be afforded consideration by our courts.
295 P.2d 229
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Perhaps the above title is misleading because in the writer's opinion,
the Colorado guest statute needs no defense. It is my opinion that it
has served a useful purpose in the past, is still serving a useful purpose
and should be retained as the law of Colorado.
The guest statute to which I refer reads as follows:
"No person transported by the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such
owner or operator for injury, death or loss in case of accident,
unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of
such owner or operator or caused by his intoxication, or by
negligence consisting of a willful and wanton disregard of the
rights of others. The provisions of this Section shall not relieve
a public carrier or any owner or operator of a motor vehicle,
while the same is being demonstrated to a prospective purchaser, of responsibility for any injuries sustained by a passenger being transported by such public carrier or by such
owner or operator."'
It is interesting to note that this statute was passed by the Colorado
Legislature and became law on April 29, 1931, and although criticized
at times by individual members of our supreme court, and
criticized severely by some plaintiffs' attorneys, this statute has never
been amended, much less repealed.
At the present time, twenty-seven states have guest statutes, varying,
of course, in certain degrees in their range. Massachusetts, while having no guest statute, applies a common law rule to the effect that there
must be gross negligence before the guest can recover. This means that
twenty-eight states at the present time have laws either statutory or
judicial preventing recovery of damages by the guest from the host for
simple negligence.
I Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-9-1

(1953).
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As far as I am advised, only one state which formerly had a guest
statute has repealed it, that state being Connecticut. It will thus be
seen that in the majority of the states a guest cannot recover damages
from his host for simple negligence.
Guest statutes were first enacted in the "Roaring Twenties." Iowa,
Connecticut, Oregon and Vermont were four of the first states to enact
such statutes. As noted above, the Colorado Legislature passed the guest
statute in 1931, and in that same year our neighboring states of Wyoming, Nebraska, North Dakota and Montana also enacted guest statutes.
It is interesting to note various reasons given for the enactment
of guest statutes. The United States Supreme Court in Silver v. Silver,'
holding that the Connecticut guest statute was constitutional, stated
that the reason for a statute of this nature was as follows:
"The use of the automobile as an instrument of transportation is peculiarly the subject of regulation. We cannot assume
that there are no evils to be corrected or permissible social
objects to be gained by the present statute. We are not unaware

of the increasing frequency of litigation in which passengers
carried gratuitously in automobiles, often casual guests or
licensees, have sought the recovery of large sums for injuries
alleged to have been due to negligent operation. In some jurisdictions it has been judicially determined that a lower standard
of care should be enacted where the carriage in any type of
vehicle is gratuitous. .

.

. Whether there has been a serious

increase in the evils of vexatious litigation in this class of cases,
where the carriage is by automobile, is for legislative determination and, if found, may well be the basis of legislative action
further restricting the liability. Its wisdom is not the concern
of courts. '
Our own Colorado Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Burke in 1947 stated the purpose of guest statutes thus:
"It will help to bear in mind the purpose of these guest
statutes. Clearly they were enacted to prevent recovery by those
who had no moral right to recompense, those carried for their
own convenience, for their own business or pleasure, those invited by the operator as a mere generous gesture, 'hitch-hikers'
and 'bums' who sought to make profit out of soft hearted and
unfortunate motorists. Prior to the passage of these acts court
dockets were cluttered with such suits."'
It will be noted that while the cluttering of the courts by litigation
of this sort is one of the reasons, the main reason seems to be the moral
issue involved and, of course, the question of whether or not there is a
disruption between friendly relationships of parties by suits of this kind.
The moral issue of whether or not guests should sue their hosts for
simple negligence was undoubtedly in the minds of many people long
before the days of automobiles. For instance, Shakespeare in King Lear
has his character state:
"I am your host; with robber's hands my hospitable
favours you should not ruffle thus."'
2 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
8 Id. at 122, 123.

4 Dobbs v. Sugioka, 117 Colo. 218, 185 P.2d 785 (1947).
5 King Lear, Act III, Scene VII.
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Much criticism has been directed at guest statutes on the theory
that it is improper to take away a person's right to recover damages
for the negligent act of another. Guest statutes are not unique in this
particular. There are many other situations where the law, either by
common law, judicial decision or statute, prohibits the recovery of
damages even though there is negligence involved. For example, this
distinction between a gratuitous performance of services and the performance of such services for hire may be found in the law as between
the gratuitous bailee and the bailee for hire and between the innkeeper
and the ordinary social host.
Here in Colorado we recognize the differences between an invitee,
a licensee and a trespasser. Each of these parties is in a different position
in regard to recovery of damages even though the negligence on the
part of the landowner may be exactly the same as to all three of them.
The great weight of authority throughout the United States is to
the effect that a minor child cannot maintain an action against its
parent to recover damages for torts alleged to have been committed by
the parent in the course of the family relation and resulting in injury
to the child. The reason for this rule of intrafamily immunity was stated
in a New Jersey case as follows:

"In any event, the great weight of authority unquestionably sustains the proposition that a minor child cannot sue one
of his parents, at least during minority, for the negligent aet of
such parent from which the child suffers injury to his person.
This rule is undoubtedly founded upon a sound public policy,
and is based upon the interest that society has in preserving
harmony in domestic relations, an interest which has been
manifested since the earliest organization of civil government,
an interest inspired by the universally recognized fact that the
maintenance of harmonious and proper family relations is conducive to good citizenship, and therefore works to the welfare
of the state."'
Is not this rule even harsher than our guest statute, if our opponents care to call the guest rule harsh? Under this rule a minor child
cannot recover, whereas under our Colorado court's interpretation of
the Colorado guest statute, a child of tender years is not capable of
becoming a guest and can recover.'
6 Mannion v. Mannion. 3 N.J. Misc. 68. 129 Atd. 431 (Cir. Ct. 1925).
7 Green v. Jones, 319 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1957).
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Many other examples of inability to recover damages for negligence
or the limitation of such recovery could be cited. Among these are the
rule of sovereign immunity, the Colorado wrongful death statute limiting damages to $25,000,8 the Colorado statute limiting the amount of
damages that an employee may recover from his employer for the negligence of a co-employee to $10,000,' and the judicial rule that a wife
may not recover for loss of consortium by reason of a third party's
negligent injury to her husband.
As pointed out by our Supreme Court in the case of Green v. Jones,
"The status of 'guest' under the statute is acquired only by knowingly
and voluntarily accepting the invitation to become so."'" In other words,
what this really amounts to is that our legislature has said that a guest
assumes the risk of ordinary negligence. Consequently, as everyone is
presumed to know the law, any guest who desires to accept a ride with
a host driver does so knowingly and voluntarily, assuming the risk of
the driver's ordinary negligence. If a person does not care to assume
that risk then he does not have to accept the ride. While our legislature
has gone this far, our supreme court has gone even farther in that,
while the guest statute lists intoxication as one of the exceptions to the
non-liability of the host, still if the guest accepts a ride knowing that
the host is intoxicated, he assumes that risk and cannot recover."
We are not unmindful of the recent case of Noakes v. Gaiser,"
where the Honorable Albert T. Frantz, of the Colorado Supreme Court,
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he took the position that our Colorado guest statute is unconstitutional, recognizing, however, that the
overwhelming weight of authority has sustained this type of legislation
on the theory that it is a proper exercise of the police power. With due
regard to Mr. Justice Frantz' opinion, we most heartily disagree with
his conclusion and agree with the United States Supreme Court that
guest statutes of this nature are constitutional.
In that dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frantz gave his thoughts on
the policy behind guest statutes to be as follows:
"The compelling idea for the sanction of such legislation
is the notion that guests have been guilty of collusion, fraud
and bad faith in advancing claims. In other words, presumptively guest and host frequently connive in the pressing of
claims in order to mulct the insurance carrier. Admittedly, such
instances have occurred and will occur, but what should be
done with the great number of bona fide claims based upon
negligence? Such presumption of dishonorable conduct on the
part of host and guest is contrary to the presumption generally
prevailing of fair dealing and common honesty."''"
We most respectfully submit that that is only one of the reasons for the
enactment of guest statutes, but that, in our opinion, is a very cogent
reason. In a recent Harper's Magazine article entitled "Damage Suits:
A Primrose Path to Immorality," Morton M. Hunt wrote:
8 Colo.

Rev. Stat. § 41-1-1 (1953).
9 Id. § 80-6-4.
10 319 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Colo. 1957).
11 Haller v. Gross, 135 Colo. 218, 309 P.2d 598 (1957).
12 315 P.2d 183 (Colo. 1957).
13 Id. at 189.
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"A considerable number of plaintiffs, lawyers, and jurors
have come to feel that the defendant's ability to pay is the main
point at issue. Even if the injury be invisible, even if the defendant's fault is hard to prove, the key issue is this: can he afford to pay? If so, let him. Jurors thus often play a kind of
Robin Hood role; but however noble theft may seem in the
legend, it is still theft. And when it becomes common practice, it
can destroy the social order it preys upon.""
"Judges interpret the law in the light of the morality of
their own times. If our courts are broadening liability to a
frightening
extent, it is because too many Americans like it that
''
way.

15

Woodrow Wilson in 1893 stated that "law is the crystallization of
the habit and thought of society." In our opinion, the crystallization of
the thought of society at the time the Colorado guest statute was enacted
was that the greatest good to the greatest number would be served by
having these guest statutes. The reasons for the enactment of the guest
statute have not diminished. In fact, the reasons have become stronger
than ever, and it is my opinion that the guest statute should be kept
on our statute books irrespective of whether the host does or does not
have insurance. The question of insurance should not enter into the
problem. If a plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from a defendant,
he should be allowed that recovery irrespective of whether or not the
defendant is insured. Neither the right of recovery nor the amount of
recovery should rest upon the question of insurance.
The fact that the majority of the states do have guest statutes and
have had them for years and that only one state legislature has repealed
its guest statute is evidence that the majority of the people still feel that
if; is to the best interest of the public that such laws be maintained.
If society desires to do away with such defenses as assumption of
risk, contributory negligence and sovereign immunity, or if it desires
to allow the recovery of damages without fault, well and good. Until
society so decides, I believe our guest statute should remain as part of the
law of this state. I respectfully submit that the most good to the most
people will be obtained by the continuance of the guest statute rather
than by its repeal.
Harper's, Jan. 1957, pp. 67, 68.
15Id. at 70.
'4
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Sometimes the best interests of the public, and the best interests of
America's powerful casualty companies meet at loggerheads. It is the
purpose of this paper to demonstrate that the Colorado guest statute is
undesirable from the standpoint of the public welfare, and that the
arguments which have been advanced in its favor do not stand up under
scrutiny.
The Colorado guest statute was drafted by Kenneth M. Wormwood,
prominent Denver defense lawyer.' Credit for its enactment has been
claimed by the American Automobile Association, which recently said
in its club paper: "Back in 1931 when this law was put on the books,
Club President Clarence Werthan was instrumental in convincing the
General Assembly that such legislation was needed."'
If.

ANALYSIS

OF ARGUMENTS

ADVANCED

IN

SUPPORT

OF

THE

"GUEST STATUTE"

A. It has been said that the guest statute prevents claims from
hitch-hikers and others, who are given free rides as a generous gesture on
the part of the driver. This argument does not take into account that
under the common law even the guest must prove the host was negligent, must prove proximate cause, and must defend against the charges
of his own contributory negligence or his assumption of the risk.' When
one is invited to ride in an automobile, the driver certainly should owe
him a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of that vehicle.
1

Proceedings, Colo. Bar Ass'n Negligence Section 34 (1956).

in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-9-1

The statute appears

(1953).

2 28 Rocky Mtn. Motorist 1 (Feb. 1958).
3 Despite the opinion in

Pettingell v.

Moede,

129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1030 (1954),

discussed elsewhere in this paper, many trial courts are still setting forth the guest
statute verbatim in their instructions to juries and are submitting instructions on
negligence and contributory negligence.
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If an injury is sustained as the result. of the driver's ordinary negligence,
the guest passenger should be entitled to recover damages for his injuries. The relationship of guest and driver is not different from the

relationship between guest and host in a motor boat, in an airplane, or
in a home. By insuring against the risk of negligent injury to his guests,
a host protects his friends and neighbors, and insures their continued
friendship.
1931 was a year of depression, a year when hitch-hikers were seen
frequently along the roadside. As was explained in Dobbs v. Sugioka,' the
statute was justified on the basis that it prevented recoveries by such

people as were given rides by generous motorists. But, tragically, the
broad language of the law has defeated the claims of innumerable deserving victims of injury who could not under any circumstances be
classified as "bums" or hitch-hikers. There is nothing in the statute to
limit its application to such individuals. It applies equally to neighbors,
co-workers, friends, relatives, and all who ride in automobiles as guests.
B. It has been said that there could be many "fake" claims where
passengers might take advantage of an accident to collect huge sums of
money for pretended injuries.' Does this mean that we do not trust
our court system to decide between meritorious claims and fraudulent
ones? Does it mean that there is no control in our courts over excessive
verdicts and judgments? If it does mean those things, then we have no
effective judicial system in this country. This fallacious argument not
only underestimates our court system, but also presumes dishonorable

conduct by claimants as a sweeping generality. This writer is not ready
to accept such cynical propositions. In a significant dissenting opinion in
Noakes v. Gaiser,' Mr. Justice Frantz said:

"The compelling idea for the sanction of such legislation is
the notion that guests have been guilty of collusion, fraud and
bad faith in advancing claims. In other words, presumptively
guest and host frequently connive in the pressing of claims in
order to mulct the insurance carrier. Admittedly, such instances
have occurred and will occur, but what should be done with the
great number of bona fide claims based upon negligence? Such
presumption of dishonorable conduct on the part of host and
guest is contrary to the presumption generally prevailing of fair
dealing and common honesty."'
C. It has also been argued that if we did not have a guest statute
our courts would be cluttered with cases. An argument like this is poor

justification for any law. If it is just and proper that an injured guest
should recover, how can we deny him access to the courts on the excuse
that the courts are too crowded? Obviously, we should design the facilities of our courts to fit the case load, rather than limit the case load by
the available facilities.

Speaking for the court in Canon City v. Merris,' Mr. Justice Frantz
attacked this idea of expediency in the solution of legal problems. He
said: "A resort to expediency in the law is always dangerous; the indi4 117 Colo. 218, 185 P.2d 784 (1947).
5 See note 2 supra.
6 315 P.2d 183 (Colo. 1957).
7 Id. at 189.
8 323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958).
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vidual dignity of the person and his rights are likely to be trammeled
when such becomes the recourse of the law."'
Indeed, the guest statute has itself resulted in some cluttering. By
actual count, there have been thirty-four cases in our supreme court
construing the guest statute. Each new opinion raises further litigation.
The confusing and self-contradictory language of the statute is destined
to spawn more and more cases until our supreme court finally declares
the statute unconstitutional, or until our legislature repeals it. Lawyers
who look to these thirty-four cases for guidance find only a confused
maze of contradictory decisions defining and re-defining, but never quite
explaining what must be proved in a guest case. In nearly all of these
cases the supreme court has been forced to engage in judicial fact-finding, adding up the facts, and deciding whether a particular situation
falls on this side or that side of a wavering line. Given a specific fact
situation, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant seems to have difficulty 10in finding some of these thirty-four cases favorable to his point of
view.
D. We have been told that the guest statute holds down insurance
rates. That is undoubtedly true. But would it not be better to pay a
higher premium for more adequate protection? The public is paying the
bill anyway, although not in the form of insurance premiums. It is paid
in taxes to support public hospitals and welfare institutions where impoverished victims of the guest statute are always to be found. It is
paid through contributions to charities, religious and non-religious,
which every day spend fabulous sums of money to succor the impoverished victims of this legal vacuum called the guest statute. Insurance
has proved its usefulness in this age of speed and twisted metal by spreading the risk of injury, so that the suffering and the bereaved will not
have to bear the full brunt of the economic incidents of their misfortunes. The victim of ordinary negligence is usually protected by the
tortfeasor's liability insurance policy. There should be no difference
when the negligence is that of a driver and the injured person is a nonpaying passenger. The suffering and the loss are the same. The objective
of insurance is not to hold down rates but is to spread the risk. It is so
obvious that it should go without saying that this objective of spreading the risk is better accomplished without a guest statute.
E. I'Ve have heard it argued that domestic harmony would be
disrupted if members of the same family were permitted to sue one another. This is pure conjecture, and the result may very well be the opposite. Nothing disrupts domestic harmony so much as the financial
hardship and worry resulting from sudden and unexpected medical
expenses and loss of income. It is more likely that compensation through
insurance would result in improved domestic tranquility. Then too, our
present statute does not forbid suits among members of the same family, it merely forces them to charge willful and wanton misconduct.
9 Id. at 616.
10 Here are some interesting statistics: Twenty-seven of these thirty-four appeals
were made by defendants, and only seven by plaintiffs. This would seem to indicate
that, generally speaking. defendants are better able to finance appeals than are
injured plaintiffs. Only twice has the court upset a defendant's decision below, but
the supreme court has reversed judgments in favor of the plaintiff fifteen times.
Possibly the attitude of the people, as reflected by juries, is more liberal toward
claimants than has been the attitude of the supreme court.
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F. We have heard the argument that the guest statute provides a
clear and concise yardstick with which liability can be determined. We
have already demonstrated the volume of litigation which has attempted
so unsuccessfully to tell us what the statute really means. Let us look
again at the statute.
What is the meaning of the phrase, "unless such accident shall have
been intentional"? Several cases have dealt with this internal conflict
of accident versus intention. Mr. Justice Holland, dissenting in Ling v.
Pease," said that in his opinion the clear intent of the legislature in
enacting the law was to limit liability of the driver or owner to "intentional accident, intoxication and willful and wanton disregard of the
rights of others."'" At that time we were not enlightened as to the
meaning of the term "intentional accident." Later, in Lewis v. Oliver,"
the same judge, then writing for the court, again mentioned "intentional
accident" as one of the three conditions which must be established
by the plaintiff, but added in parenthesis " (if anyone knows what that
means) ."1

In Pettingell v. Moede," Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the court,
said: "The language of the Statute is unfortunate in at least two particulars, the first of which is intentional accident. It immediately is
clear that where one intentionally wrecks a motor vehicle, that is no
accident. With this, however, we are not here concerned ... 16
Justice Holland wrote another dissent in Noakes v. Gaiser, and
said:
"The inconceivable terms found in the above statute
makes (sic) our statute different in some respects to the socalled guest statutes of other states. Witness: '.

.

. unless such

accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner
or operator. ...

.'If

what happened here or in other similar

cases was 'intentional', then it was not accidental ..

""

What happens to our "clear and concise yardstick" when we
attempt to decide what "intentional accident" means? This writer submits that in all of the thirty-four Colorado Supreme Court cases we
have never been told what those words mean. This, we believe, is because the court cannot tell us what those words mean. There is something wrong with a statute that cannot be construed.
But let us examine the statute further. It says "or by negligence
consisting of a willful and wanton disregard of the rights of others."
What does this mean? In the early case of Millington v. Hiedloff,8 the
court apparently did not see the contradition between the terms "negligence" on the one hand, and "willful and wanton" on the other. In the
Millington case the court stated that in order for an injured plaintiff
to succeed he must prove not only negligence, but also willfulness. In
11 123 Colo. 518, 232 P.2d 189 (1951).
Id. at 526, 232 P.2d at 193.
13 129 Colo. 479. 271 P.2d 1055 (1954).
14 Id. at 481, 271 P.2d at 1056.
15 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954).
16 Id.
at 490, 271 P.2d at 1042.
17 315 P.2d 183, 184 (1957).
1s 96 Colo. 581, 45 P.2d 937 (1935).
12
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another case decided on the same day, the court declared that the phrase
"willful and wanton disregard" presents no serious problem, and that
its meaning "seems so self-evident that attempts at further definition
involve the risk of explaining 'what seems most clear so clearly that it
seems perplexed'."" The court went on to assert that willful and wanton
means just about the same thing as wanton and reckless.
As the cases piled up, little light was shed upon this contradiction
in terms until 1951, when Mr. Justice Holland in a dissent described
the word "negligence" in the statute as "a meaningless expression.""0
It was his opinion that the statute required something beyond negligence, therefore the words "negligence" and "contributory negligence"
have no proper place in a guest statute case. At this point it occurred
to the writer that if words such as "accident" and "negligence" must
be completely stricken from the statute in order to Puzzle out its meaning, is not the statute too vague for enforcement?
Returning to the case of Pettingell v. Moede, that opinion asserted
that if a thing is intentionally clone it is done through neither negligence nor accident. Judge Holland repeated this seemingly irrefutable
idea in his dissent in a 1957 case."
The Pettingell case also tells us that the word "willful" means
intentional or purposeful, and "wanton" connotes an even higher degree
of culpability, even at times implying evil.
19 Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 7, 45
20 Ling v. Pease. 123 Colo. 518, 526;
Noakes v. Gaiser. 315 P.2d 1S3. 1S4
22Pettingell v. Moede. 129 Colo. 484,

21
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P.2d 940, 941
232 P.2d 189,
(Colo. 1957)
491, 271 P.2d

(193o).
193 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
(dissenting opinion).
1038, 1042 (1954).
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Apparently, we are now at this point in the development of the
legal construction of this confusing statute: the words "accident" and
"negligence" must be read out of the statute completely. The words
"willful and wanton" connote an intentional or purposeful act. Let
us
then return to the statute and paraphrase it as it now seems to be construed:
"No person transported by the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such
owner or operator for injury, death or loss ..., unless . . . intentional on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his
intoxication, or by . . . (intentional) disregard of the rights
of others."
To say this is an entirely unnatural result is to put it mildly. It is far
from the original language found in the statute. We have here a meaningless jumble of conflicting terms, and no amount of judicial patchwork or elimination of words can give the law a clear meaning. As a
practical matter the supreme court can do nothing but guess at what
the legislature really intended.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GUEST STATUTE
The Colorado Constitution is a creation of the citizens of this
state, and represents their desires concerning their government. In
Noakes v. Gaiser, the parties did not raise the constitutional issue, nor
has this issue ever been raised in any of the thirty-four Colorado cases.
However, Mr. Justice Frantz, dissenting in Noakes, contended that the
statute violates a constitutional guarantee, "That courts of justice shall
be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury
to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay."23
When one considers that the Colorado guest statute precludes the
courts from considering many negligence actions which would have
been justiciable at common law, he begins to understand the strength
of Justice Frantz's argument. The statute does not merely curtail a
common law action, it totally eliminates it. The constitutional violation
is clear and obvious. It cannot be ignored. No purpose is to be served
by further detailing the important dissenting opinions in this case,
but one other quotation deserves repeating:
"We render threadbare the fundamental fabric of government, our Constitution, if we sanction legislation such as the
guest statute. The language of our Constitution is significant;
and if we would but seek we may seize the profoundest and
most far-reaching meaning, by turning over each familiar word,
and looking at it in the light of the primitive idea it was used
to designate. Such quest for meaning would go far in restoring
vigor and vitality to this fundamental document.''24
Mr. Justice Moore wrote a concurring opinion in Canon City v.
Merris, in which he stated:
"I deem it to be the duty of this court to breathe life and
23 315 P.2d 185, citing Colo. Const. art. II,
by Judge Frantz).
24 315 P.2d at 189 (dissenting opinion).

§ 6 (dissenting opinion, emphasis added
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vitality into the constitutions of the state and the nation, to
the end that they shall in a practical way accomplish for the
individual the objectives intended by the people who adopted
them as the supreme law of the land. I am not interested in
mental gymnastics, the purpose of which is to search for some
plausible excuse for holding a constitutional provision to be
an empty shell when resorted to by one for whose benefit the
provision was unquestionably intended.
"The danger which threatens our democratic processes
does not stem from the actions of appellate courts which give
strength, vitality and new life to constitutional provisions. The
danger is that all too often courts of last resort fritter away
constitutional protections, and little by little destroy the basic
freedoms of which we speak so often and which we actually
apply too seldom in bringing them within the reach of the
citizen.""
CONCLUSION

IV.

The Colorado automobile guest statute has done far more harm
than good. The best that can be said for it is that it has held down
insurance rates, but this is of questionable benefit to those unfortunate
members of our public who have been victims of this statute's rigorous
and confusing terms. It is to be hoped that the Colorado Supreme Court
will wipe this obnoxious law from our law books before it does even
further damage. If the guest statute has not been invalidated by court
action before the 1959 session of the Colorado Legislature meets, our
elected representatives should take the initiative and repeal it.
25 323 P.2d 614, 623, 624 (Colo. 1958).

SAVINGS ACCOUNTS EARNELIGIBLE FOR INVESTMENT
OF ESTATE AND TRUST
FOUNDED 1923

*

FUNDS-

54

v
current
rate

GUIDED BY DENVER LEADERS

DIRECTORS
GERALD L. SCHLESSMAN, Chairman of the Board
Pres., Greeley Gas Co.
FRANK J. JOHNS
Pres.,Denver Dry Goods Co.
CHARLES J. KELLY
Partner, Low Firm, Lee, Bryans, Kelly
and Stansfield
WALTER K. KOCH
Pres., Mtn. States Tel.& Tel.Co.

C. ROY MUCHOW
Pres., Denver Terra Cotta Co.
HENRY L. NEUSCHAEFER
Pres., Silver State Savings &
Loan Association
ROBERT H. REEVES
Pres.,Carlson-Frink Dairy Co-

DENVER, COLO.

IU

ILVE

AND

un~TA~
ur

*1636

STATE SAVING

LOAN ASSOCIATION

MEMBER: Federal Soyings & Loan Insurance Corp.

Welton St.

Cherry Creek Center
*Lakeside Center
*

Federal Home Loon Bank System

DICTA

MAY-JUNE,

1958

NOTES

RES JUDICATA-THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF
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Most lawyers are familiar with the doctrine of res judicata.' However, many of them are not very well acquainted with the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, a flexible segment of res judicata.' The two doctrines
are closely related parts of the law of judgments.' They are similar but
distinct.' Although one is considered to be a part of the other, they apply to different situations and have different effects. One narrows the
scope of inquiry, the other operates as a complete bar. One is somewhat
flexible, the other is rigid. It is helpful, therefore, to understand the
fundamental differences between them.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

At the outset, definitions of the two doctrines will help to frame
the necessary distinctions. Res judicata is the doctrine that an existing
final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties in a subsequent suit based
on the same claim.' On the other hand, collateral estoppel is the doctrine that the final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction on an
issue actually litigated and determined is conclusive of that issue in a
subsequent suit between the same parties based on a different cause of
action.7
In identifying collateral estoppel the courts use varied terminology,
such as: "estoppel by record," "estoppel by findings," "estoppel by ver1The "merger" and "bar" aspects of res judicata are discussed in Bigelow,
Estoppel 41 (6th ed. 1913).
2 See Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L. Rev.
217 (1954).
3 Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 -arv. L. Rev. 1 (1942).
4 Id. at 3.
5 Grand Valley Irrigation Co. v. Fraita Improvement Co., 37 Colo. 483, 501, 86 Pae.
324, 329 (1906).
6 Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Ginsberg, 131 Colo. 1, 278 P.2d 1018 (1955).

7 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876) (leading Supreme Court case on
the distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel).
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dict," and "estoppel by judgment."' Since the use of different terms to describe the same legal doctrine can be a source of confusion, it is necessary to mention that these terms actually do stand for the same proposition. Another point that should be kept in mind with respect to the
use of terms is that the courts often use the term res judicata to include
collateral estoppel.'
As has been observed already, there are several features of res
judicata and collateral estoppel which distinguish one from the other.
For one thing, the area of applicability is different. That is to say, collateral estoppel applies to a cause of action different from that involved
in the original controversy but res judicata applies to a suit based on the
same cause of action as that involved in the original controversy. In
this respect collateral estoppel is broader than the "merger" and "bar"
aspects of res judicata." However, it does not apply to matters which
could have been litigated but were not. " In this respect it is narrower
than the "merger" and "bar" aspects of res judicata. "
With these preliminary distinctions in mind, attention is directed
toward the doctrine of collateral estoppel as applied by the courts. It is
submitted that, while the basic requirements of the doctrine are clear,
the language and analyses in the cases are far from satisfactory. The wide
scope of the subject matter does not permit a complete treatment here,
but it is hoped that the sources referred to will provide an adequate supplement. No attempt will be made to discuss res judicata in its "merger"
and "bar" aspects. That is beyond the limited scope of this note. However, cases dealing with collateral estoppel will be viewed in relation to
general principles of applicability. In addition, some Colorado cases in
which the doctrine has been applied will be discussed. It is hoped that
in this setting some worthwhile conclusions can be drawn.
AREA OF APPLICABILITY

A. Matters Actually Litigated and Determined

It is well settled that in order to invoke the doctrine of collateral
estoppel it is necessary that the issues sought to be relitigated have been
actually litigated and determined in a prior action between the same
parties." Consequently, while those matters which were litigated and
determined of necessity in the prior action cannot be relitigated, the
parties are not precluded from relying upon matters which were not litigated and which give rise to a different claim for relief." This is true
even though the new matter could have been determined in the original
action.

The scope of applicability with respect to matters actually litigated
and determined has been passed upon many times. A few illustrations
will show that the courts are reluctant to preclude a party from litigating an issue when he has not had his day in court as to that issue.
8

See note 2 supra.
International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir.
9 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
1941); Youngquest v. Youngquest, 102 Colo. 105, 110, 76 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1938).
10 See note 7 supra.
11 See note 1 supra.
12 Peckham v. Family Loan Co., 196 F.2d S38 (5th Cir. 1952).
13 See note 1 supra.
14 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Hinsdale County v. Mineral
County, 38 Colo. 433, 88 Pac. 436 (1907).
15Youngquest v. Youngquest, 102 Colo. 105. 76 P.2d 1117 (1938).
16 Ibid.

DICTA

MAY-JUNE,

1958

In Cromwell v. County of Sac," a leading United States Supreme
Court case, the plaintiff brought an action to recover on coupons accrued on bonds. In its answer the defendant averred that the bonds
had been issued fraudulently because a county official had been bribed.
A judgment for the defendant was affirmed on the ground that the bonds
had been issued fraudulently and that the plaintiff had not proved
payment of value. After the bonds had matured the plaintiff brought
a second action to recover the principal and the interest accrued after
the first action. The defendant county pleaded the former judgment,
asserting that the question of payment of value had been determined.
The defendant received a favorable judgment on that ground but the
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court and it reversed. The Court
held that the question of payment of value actually had not been litigated and that the prior judgment worked an estoppel only as to matters actually decided.
In a 1906 case1" the Colorado Supreme Court followed the Cromwell
decision. A stockholder brought an action to enjoin the execution of a
contract by a company of which he was a member. He alleged that the
company had made a contract in violation of its charter and by-laws
and that it was unlawfully attempting to assess him. A decree for the
plaintiff was entered, enjoining the company from executing the contract or levying any assessment for that purpose. Thereafter, the original assessment was reduced and the plaintiff was notified of the new
assessment. Upon his failure to pay, the plaintiff's stock was sold pursuant to the by-laws. The plaintiff then brought another action for damages on the ground that such sale was illegal because the assessment was
void, in accordance with the former decree. The defendant sought to
show that the reduced assessment was proper. The court held that the
judgment in the first suit was not necessarily conclusive against the
validity of the reduced assessment and that the burden was upon the
plaintiff to show that the validity of the original assessment had been
litigated and determined in the first action."
In Jacobson v. Miller," an early Michigan case, the plaintiff sued
the defendant to recover some rentals due under a lease. There was a
judgment for the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought another
action under the same lease to recover rentals subsequently due. This
17 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
is Grand Valley Irrigation
324 (1906).
19 Id. at 503, 86 Pac. 329.
20 41 Mich. 90 (1879).
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time the defendant denied that the lease had been executed. The lower
court held that the earlier judgment precluded the defendant from making such a denial. On appeal the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
the lower court because the question of execution had not been litigated
in the first action. However, the court indicated that if the question of
execution had been raised and litigated in the first action, it would have
been a final determination of that issue even though the second suit was
based on a different cause of action.
The three cases just discussed clearly show the difference between
the effect of a judgment as a bar against the bringing of a second action
based on the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties and based on a different claim or
demand. If the second suit is based on the same claim, the first judgment constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. It concludes the
parties as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim and as to every other substantial matter which might have
been offered for that purpose. But if the second action is based on a
claim or demand different from that involved in the first action, the
judgment operates as an estoppel only as to 2 those
matters which were
1
actually litigated and determined in the first.
B. Matters Immaterial or unessential to the First Judgment
In addition to the requirement that the issue must have been actually litigated and determined in the first action, there is another rule
which narrows the area of applicability even further and which presents
more subtle problems when it is applied to a given case. A statement
of this rule is that even where a matter is puLit
in issue and decided, it is
not concluded by the judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel, if it
was immaterial or unessential to the determination of the real and decisive issue."2
The rule was applied by the 'Wisconsin Supreme Court in Schofield
v. Rideout." In that case a daughter had brought an action against her
father, alleging that she had conveyed certain land to him, that he had
agreed to sell it and pay the proceeds to her and that he had broken the
21

Grand

Valley

Irrigation Co.

v.

Fruita. Improvement

Co., 37 Colo. at 500,

501,

S6 Pac. at 328 (1906).
22 Landon v. Clark, 221 Fed. 841 (2d Cir. 1915): House v. Lockwood. 137 N.Y. 259,
33 N.E. 595 (1893): Word v. Coll.ey, 173 S.-\%.
48 Wyo. 403. 49 P.2d 670 (1935).
.
2:3233 Wis. 550, 290 N.-\A155 (1940).

629 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914): Willis v. Willis,
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agreement. The court found that such an agreement had been made
but that the father had not violated it because he had tried to sell the
land and had been unable to find a buyer. Accordingly, a judgment
was entered dismissing the complaint. Thereafter, an assignee of the
daughter's interest brought an action against the father. The plaintiff
alleged that the father had subsequently conveyed the land to his wife.
The plaintiff offered proof of the agreement but did not prove the conveyance had been made. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the agreement was conclusively established by
the former judgment. The supreme court reversed and remanded for
trial on the question of the existence of the agreement. The court based
its decision on the ground that the finding in the first action that the
agreement existed was not necessary to the decision.
Although the view followed in the Schofield case seems to be well
established, 4 Clark v. Knox,"5 a 1904 Colorado case, may be cited for
the opposite view. In that case the grantee of an insolvent debtor brought
an action against an attaching creditor to remove a cloud from the title
to certain real estate. The pleadings raised two issues. One was that the
conveyance by the debtor was in fraud of creditors, the other that the
deed was delivered after the levy of attachment. The trial court found
both issues in favor of the attaching creditor. On appeal the appellate
court reversed the trial court on the question of fraud, holding that the
conveyance was not fraudulent, but it affirmed the judgment on the second issue. In a subsequent action between the same parties but involving other real property conveyed by the same deed and levied on by
writ of execution after the delivery of the deed, the court held that the
prior judgment on the question of fraud was res judicata. The court
said:
"The fact that it was not essential that the court of appeals
should pass on the question of fraud, because the judgment was
predicated entirely upon the finding on the other issue in the
case . . . is not material. Such a finding, it is true, was conclusive of the rights of the parties, yet this did not preclude the
court from passing upon the other issue of fraud which was presented by the pleadings and argued by counsel."2
The decision in Clark v. Knox is not too far out of line when one
realizes that the question of fraud had been argued before the Colorado
Court of Appeals and had been decided on the merits. Indeed if the
court had reached the opposite result, the defendant would have had to
defend a second time against the allegation that the conveyance was
fraudulent. It is submitted that the language of the Colorado Supreme
Court to the effect that the applicability of collateral estoppel or res
judicata must always be considered in connection with the facts of the
particular case must not be taken lightly."
C.

Prior Determination of Negligence

The determination of the question of negligence is an area which
requires close examination and one which is particularly interesting in
the application of collateral estoppel. The two cases set out below
indicate the complexity of problems raised by applying the doctrine
24 See note 22 supra.
25 32 Colo. 342, 76 Pac. 372 (1904).
26 Id. at 352, 353, 76 Pac. at 375.
27 Youngquest v. Youngquest, 102 Colo. 105, 108, 76 P.2d 1117, 1118 (1938).
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in this area. Under a different heading the really controversial question as to whether strangers to the initial action should be allowed
to rely on collateral estoppel in certain types of negligence cases will
receive some brief comment.
In Cambria v. Jeffrey," the Massachusetts court refused to apply
the doctrine on the ground that a finding as to the issue of negligence,
which was crucial in the second case, had not been essential to the decision in the first action. The case was an action for damages arising
out of an automobile collision. The trial court found that the collision
was the result of the concurrent negligence of the parties and gave judgment for the defendant. The defendant in the first action turned around
and sued the former plaintiff for damages from the collision. A jury
verdict in his favor was set aside on the ground that the earlier judgment, since it determined that both parties were guilty of negligence,
precluded recovery. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed and
judgment was entered on the verdict.
An interesting contrast to the Cambria decision is Lamberton
Coach Co. v. Stone, 9 a North Carolina case involving the question of
conclusiveness of a consent judgment in a negligence case. A bus passenger died as the result of a collision between a tractor and the
bus. His personal representative brought an action for wrongful death
and joined the tractor company and the bus company as defendants.
Each defendant denied liability and alleged that the other was negligent.
However, a consent judgment was entered granting the plaintiff recovery from the co-defendants. In a later action the bus company
sued the tractor company and the latter set up the consent judgment as
a bar to recovery. The court held the defense good since the negligence
of the plaintiff had been determined judicially in the prior action.
D.

Applicability of the Doctrine to Non-Parties

In order to take advantage of collateral estoppel the person asserting its applicability must have been a party to the prior proceeding
or in privity with a party."0 This principle has been strictly applied
so that nominal parties and parties not having a real interest in the
controversy will not be collaterally estopped from raising issues determined in a prior suit based on a different cause of action. 1
An interesting case in which the court might well have applied
collateral estoppel had it not been for the doctrine of identity of parties
is Gilman v. Gilman." There the plaintiff's wife had been injured
while riding as a passenger in the defendant's car. The wife sued for
damages and recovered. Subsequently, the husband sued the same defendant for loss of his wife's services and for medical expenses. The
defendant's liability in the action brought by the husband depended
on the same facts that had established the defendant's negligence in the
action previously brought by the wife. Despite the identity of the issues,
the court held that the defendant could again deny the negligent character of his driving.
The Gilman case represents the prevailing view. There is some
indication, however, that strict adherence to the requirement of identity
28

29
30
31
32

307 Mass. 49, 29 N.E.2d 555 (1940).
235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (1952).
Gumieny v. Hess, 285 Mich. 411, 280 N.WV. 809 (1938).
Rosenfield v. Rosenfield, 212 Ind. 120, 6 N.E.2d 938 (1937).
115 Vt. 49, 51 A.2d 46 (1947).
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of parties may be breaking down." It would appear that where the
issues are identical, e.g., in a series of actions by passengers injured
through the fault of a common carrier in the same accident-the courts
should not adhere blindly to the requirement of identity of parties.
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE SAME CLAIM

The question as to what constitutes the same claim isof great importance because res judicata applies where the second action is based
on the same claim and collateral estoppel applies where the second
action is based on a different claim. The rule that parties may be precluded from relitigating an issue even though the second suit is based
on a different cause of action is well established. 4 However, it must be
kept in mind that while res judicata concludes the rights of the parties
in the second suit, collateral estoppel only precludes relitigation of
matters determined of necessity in the prior action." The importance
of this distinction has been brought out in Colorado cases.
In Albertson v. Clark, " the plaintiff brought an action to recover
for services rendered as an attorney under a contract. He received a favorable judgment and, while the suit was pending on appeal, he brought
another action to recover for additional services rendered pursuant
to the contract. Before the second suit was disposed of the first action
had been finally determined in the attorney's favor. The defendant
sought to relitigate the issue as to whether the contract pleaded in the
first action was a forgery. The court held that the defendant could not
relitigate the issue. It said that the cause of action need not be the same
if the issue determined between the parties in the earlier action is the
same. "7
While the fact that the cause of action was not the same did not prevent the court from holding that the issue of forgery could not be relitigated in Albertson v. Clark, it had a different effect in Youngquest v.
Youngquest." In the latter case the administratrix of the decedent's
estate had obtained an order restraining the American National Bank
from paying out or disposing of any funds in a certain checking account
which allegedly was the joint account of the decedent and the claimant.
The claimant filed a petition praying that the restraining order be dissolved. The petition was denied. The claimant then commenced an action in which she alleged absolute individual ownership of a portion of
the account. She offered proof that she had put $1,800 of her own
money into the account. The Colorado Supreme Court, in holding that
she was not precluded from maintaining the action said: "The principle
contended for (res judicata) is controlling where the second action is
based on the same claim as was asserted in the first, but where the second
proceeding is based upon a different claim, only matters actually litigated
in the first action are concluded.' "
In support of its position the court emphasized that the cause of
action in the first suit had been based on the alleged existence of a joint
bank account in which the claimant had asserted the right of survivor33 Polasky, Collateral Estoppel--ffects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L.
(1954).
34 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897).
35 Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Slaght, 205 U.S. 122 (1907).
.1670 Colo. 129, 197 Pac. 757 (1921).
37 Id. at 130, 197 Pac. 758.
38 102 Colo. 105, 76 P.2d 1117 (1938).
39 Id. at 110, 76 P.2d at 1119.
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ship, whereas the suit presently before the court was based on the
claimant's alleged absolute ownership of a part of the account."°
The Youngquest case indicates the difference between the preclusive effect of res judicata and the preclusive effect of collateral estoppel.
The fact that the cause of action in the second suit was different was
the decisive factor. It was not disputed that in the initial suit the claimant asserted her right to the entire account. Thus, in a very real sense,
the subject matter involved in the second suit was also involved in the
first. In addition, the parties were identical. It was the difference in the
claim that made collateral estoppel the only possible test. Since the same
issue had not been actually litigated before, the claimant was not barred
from maintaining her action.
CONCLUSION

Collateral estoppel is a desirable doctrine which aids in the expedient termination of costly litigation. However, if it is not properly applied it can result in serious injustice. Individual cases should be
weighed in the light of sound reasoning, and basic principles should
furnish a guide to equitable results. The basic distinctions between res
judicata in its "merger" and "bar" aspects and collateral estoppel are
important. Without them the way is cluttered. As the complexity of
litigation increases, the need for well-reasoned principles shows itself
more fully. The principles are clear, the application is difficult.
40

Id. at 111, 76 P.2d at 1120.
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THE DOCTRINE

In May 1948, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,' reversing the Missouri Supreme Court
holding which had sustained the right to enforce by injunction private
racially restrictive covenants relative to real property. The Court held
that such judicial enforcement violated the equal protection provision
of the fourteenth amendment.! At the same time the Court, in Hurd v.
Hodge' held that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
by the District of Columbia courts is prohibited by the Federal Civil
Rights Act.' The Court went further:
"It is not consistent with the public policy of the United
States to permit federal courts in the Nation's capital to exercise
general equitable powers to compel action denied the state
courts where such action has been held violative of the guarantee
of equal protection of the laws." 5
These cases were hailed as landmark cases in constitutional law.
Prior to 1948, it generally had been held that such private restrictions
could be judicially enforced. The Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan
v. Buckley' contributed to this view. In that case the Court had held
that since the suit was brought in the District of Columbia, it could
present no issues under the fourteenth amendment and that the question of the validity of judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenant
1334 U.S. 1, (1948).

2 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3 334 U.S. 24, (1948).
4 8 U.S.C.A. § 42.

5 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948)
6

271 U.S. 323 (1926).

(dictum).
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under the fifth amendment was not properly before the Court. The
only issue presented was the validity of the covenant as such. The Court
concluded that since the constitutional provisions invoked only inhibited government action, there was no showing that the private agreements were invalid.' The Court in the Shelley case distinguished Corrigan v. Buckley on the ground that, in the latter, there was no direct adjudication on the precise constitutional issue of judicial enforcement.
Although the Court in the Shelley case held that judicial enforcement of these private agreements was repugnant to the fourteenth
amendment, it did not hold that the agreements themselves were void.
(the fourteenth) Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
"We conclude, therefore, that restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment." '
Judicial action has always been regarded as action of the state
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. The Shelley case
cites and quotes from prior rulings of the Court.
"The federal guarantee of due process extends to state
action through its judicial as well as through its legislative,
executive or administrative branch of government."'
The precise holding of the Shelley case was that judicial action in
granting injunctions to enforce racially restrictive real property covenants was state action inconsistent with the equal protection provision
of the fourteenth amendment. The broader doctrine implied in the
holding is that any judicial enforcement of discriminatory private agreements would also be state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Writers have predicted that this broad doctrine would be applied to any case involving judicial enforcement, either directly or indirectly through refusal to act, of a discriminatory real property agreement. They have predicted further that any attempt to effect racial
discrimination by the use of devices other than real property covenants
would fall before the impact of the doctrine."
The purpose of this note is to discuss the cases subsequent to Shelley
7 See

analysis of the Corrigan case in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8 (1948).
334 U.S. at 13 (parenthetical matter added).
9 Id. at 15 (quoting with approval from Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Sav. Co. v.
Hill, 281 U.S. 673. 680).
10 Scanlon, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate, 24 Notre Dame Law 157, 177-89
(1949). Notes: 13 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 647 (1952); 37 Calif. L. Rev. 493 (1949): 29 Rocky
Mtn. L. Rev. 223, 226-31 (1957).
s
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v. Kraemer and determine what effect that decision has had on this
area of the law during the last decade.
.JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

OF

THE

DOCTRINE

In cases involving equitable action to enforce racially restrictive
covenants, the courts have generally followed the Shelley doctrine without question." The unenforceable covenant, however, has perplexed
the courts. A number of questions have been raised involving the status
of such covenants.
ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES

On the question of whether an action for damages can be maintained
there have been several judicial pronouncements. The Missouri court
in Weiss v. Leon" held that such an action could be maintained. In that
case the plaintiff had asked for specific enforcement and damages. The
trial court dismissed the entire action but the Missouri Supreme Court
thought that the count for damages should stand. The court interpreted
the Shelley case as prohibiting judicial action only in the form of equitable relief. The Oklahoma court has reached the same result on the
theory of a conspiracy grounded in tort to damage the plaintiff by reducing the value of his property."
A different result was reached in two other jurisdictions. The
district court for the District of Columbia held that while the Shelley
case dealt with equitable relief, its ruling was broad enough to cover
an action for damages." The court said: "I construe the ruling of the
Supreme Court as withholding any assistance by way of judicial action
of any kind from enforcement of such restrictive covenants."'" In Phillips
v. Naff" the Michigan court held that such suits for damages were indirect methods of enforcement which constituted an action in violation
of :the fourteenth amendment.
The question was finally settled by the United States Supreme
Court in Barrows v. Jackson." There the Court held that the fourteenth amendment prohibits state action in the form of awarding damages since this would have the effect of a sanction by the state and would
encourage the use of restrictive covenants. The Court reasoned that:
"If the State may thus punish respondent for her failure to
carry out her covenant, she is coerced to continue to use her
property in a discriminatory manner, which in essence is the
purpose of the covenant. Thus, it becomes not respondent's
voluntary choice but the State's choice that she observe her
covenant or suffer damages. The action of a state court at law
to sanction the validity of the restrictive covenant here involved
11 Coleman v. Stewart, 33 Cal. 2d 703, 204 P.2d 7 (1949); Cummings v. Hokr, 31 Cal.
2d 844, 193 P.2d 742 (1948) ; Tovey v. Levy, 401, Ill. 393, 82 N.E.2d 441 (1948); Rich v.
Jones, 142 N.J. Eq. 215, 59 A.2d 839 (1948); Goetz v. Smith, 191 Md. 707, 62 A.2d 602
(1948); Malicke v. Milan, 320, Mich. 65, 32 N.W.2d 353 (1948); Woytus v. Winkler, 357
Mo. 1082, 212 S.W.2d 411 (1948); Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N.Y. 590, 81 N.E.2d 325 (1948);
Earley v. Baughman, 200 Okla. 649, 199 P.2d 210 (1948).
12 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949).
1a Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017 (1951).
'4 Roberts v.
Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950).
15 Id. at 604.
16 232 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952).
17 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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would constitute state action as surely as it was state action to
enforce such covenants in equity, as in Shelley supra." "
The result is that courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants either in equity or at law by an action for damages. This is in
line with the broad declaration in the Shelley case that state action,
whatever the form, denying to certain persons because of race, creed,
or color the rights enjoyed by others, violates the fourteenth amendment.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT AS DEFENSE IN CONTRACT ACTION

The question of whether a discriminatory covenant can be relied on
as a defense to an action on contract is not so clearly settled. In Rice v.
Sioux City Memorial Park Cemeteiy," the plaintiff brought an action

for damages against the cemetery for its refusal to perform a contract
to bury her Indian husband. The defendant sought to escape liability
by standing on a covenant in the contract which restricted burial privileges to Caucasians. The Iowa trial court ruled that the covenant was
not void but merely unenforceable. However, the court ruled that it
could be employed as a defense to an action on the contract; and that
the court's action in permitting this defense was not state action in
violation of the fourteenth amendment." The Supreme Court of Iowa
affirmed, reasoning that Shelley v. Kraemer did not require enforcement
of the contract without regard to the covenant. "It is clear that state
action . . . has only been expanded to direct action . . . to aid in the

enforcement of restrictive or discriminating acts or agreements.""
The court felt that such direct acts were not presented where the state
maintained neutrality.

This would seem to be contrary to Barrows v. Jackson, where the
Supreme Court held that indirect aids employed to enforce such a covenant deny equal protection just as clearly as does specific performance.'
After affirming the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in a per curiam
opinion by an equally divided court, " the United States Supreme Court
vacated this judgment and dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.'

Strictly speaking, this decision had the effect of leaving

the question open.
COVENANTS

AS A

BASIS

FOR

RESCISSION

There have been some attempts to use the unenforceable covenant as
i8 Id. at 254.
19 245 Iowa 147, 60 NAV.%d 110 (1953), aff'd, per curiam, without opinion by an
equally divided court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). On rehearing, judgment vacated and writ
of certiorari dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
20 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110, 116
(1953).
21 Id. at 116.
22 See Clifton v. Puente. 218 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948): "It is as much
an enforcement of the covenant to deny a person a legal right to which he would be
entitled except for the covenant as would be to expressly command by judicial order
that the terms of the covenant be exercised and carried out."
23 Rice v.
Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
24 Rice v. Sioux City Miemorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). It was brought
out on rehearing that Iowa had passed a statute after the commencement of the
action which prohibited cemeteries from denying burial on the basis of race or color.
This statute had the effect of making the case one of isolated significance and not a
case for certiorari as prescribed by Supreme Court Rule 19.
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a basis for rescinding a contract. For example, a District of Columbia
court allowed a Negro purchaser to rescind his contract and recover his
deposit upon learning that the property was subject to an "unenforceable" restrictive covenant.25 The court reasoned that the presence of the
covenant was a source of possible litigation even though the purchaser
was assured of its unenforceability. When the contract was made, prior
to Hurd v. Hodge, the covenant was considered enforceable and the seller
owed the purchaser a duty of disclosure. Failure to disclose amounted to
a material misrepresentation even though the covenant was later declared "unenforceable." As pointed out by the court, there is a difference
between this case and those in which the seller has disclosed the existence of the covenant and the buyer has signed the contract with that
knowledge. Thus in Meckler v. Baugh,0 the buyer contracted with full
knowledge. Later, on the theory that the contract was void, he refused
to perform and brought an action to recover his deposit. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed
the lower court's decision denying his right to recover.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE COVENANT

BETWEEN THE PARTIES

Here again the unenforceable covenant caused difficulty. In Claremont Improvement Club v. Buckingham, " the California Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the lower court and refused to render a declaratory judgment on the validity of the covenant since racially restrictive
covenants are unenforceable by judicial process and a declaratory judgment would not simplify matters.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reached a different result in
Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer.8 There the
defendant conveyed the land to the plaintiff for city recreational purposes, providing that if the land should be used by persons of the Negro
race, it would revert back to the grantor. After a request by Negroes to
use a golf course on the land, plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment
to determine its rights. The trial court granted this request. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that where land automatically reverts
to the grantor upon the happening of a condition, a declaratory judgment is only a recognition of a legal fact which occurred without any
action on the part of the state and therefore did not violate the fourteenth
amendment."
The Colorado court in a declaratory judgment action apparently has
adopted the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer in its broadest form. In
Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Smith,"0 the court affirmed
a decree quieting title in the plaintiff, a Negro purchaser, and declaring that a restrictive covenant was unenforceable as a matter of law.
25 Cohn v. Trawick, 60 A.2d 926 (D.C. Munic. App. 1948). Accord, Savage v. Parks,
100 A.2d 450 (D.C. Munic. App. 1953).
26 168 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
27 89 Cal. App. 2d 32, 200 P.2d 47 (1948).
28 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955). cert. den., 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
29 Contra, Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). The grantor in
a deed provided that the land should not be sold to persons of Mexican descent and
that in the event of any violation thereof, all title to the then owner and occupant
should be forfeited to the grantor. The court did not decide whether this was a

determinable fee or a right of re-entry on condition subsequent but decided that to
enforce it would be stpte action in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
30 316 P.2d 252 (1957).
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The agreement in this case was that the lots owned by the plaintiff's predecessors in title and other property owners in the some block should not
be sold or leased to colored persons. It further provided for forfeiture,
in case the agreement was violated, to such of the then owners in the
block who should place notice of their claims of record. The supreme
court, through Mr. Justice Knauss, stated:
"No matter by what ariose terms the covenant under consideration may be classified by astute counsel, it is still a racial
restriction in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution ....

High sounding phrases or outmoded

common law terms cannot alter the effect of the agreement embraced in the instant case.
"Because the United States Supreme Court has extracted
any teeth which such covenant was supposed to have, no rights,
duties or obligations can be based thereon." (emphasis added) "

The court thus indicates there is no device-provision for forfeiture,
reverter or otherwise-by which a restrictive agreement might be legally
enforced. It treats the covenant as literally unenforceable, and refuses to
recognize it as a basis for any action, recognizing that any such action
would be in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
POSSIBLE EXTENSION

or THE DOCTRINE

Can Shelley v. Kraemer be extended beyond the realm of judicial
action to executive and administrative action? Some language in the case
would seem to support such an extension."
The United States Supreme Court, in a recent decision, found that
state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment had been exercised by the Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Phila
delphia."
Stephen Girard by a will probated in 1831, left in trust a fund for
the establishment of a college for "poor white male orphans," naming as
31 Id.

at 255.

32 See quotation from Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Say. Co. v. Hill, 271 U.S.
673, 680 (1930), in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 15.
33 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1947), rehearing
den., 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
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trustee the City of Philadelphia.' In City of Philadelphiav. Fox" it was
held that the city could act as trustee, and that an act of the state legislature, " providing for administration by a Board of Directors of City
Trusts, was a valid enactment since the Board was "disassociated from

the general government of the city.""
In 1954 two boys who applied for admission to the college were refused by the Board because they were Negroes. They then petitioned
the Orphans Court for an order directing the Board to admit them.
The order was refused and they appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court which affirmed the judgment of the Orphan's Court. The United
States Supreme Court then granted certiorari. The Court, in a per curiam

opinion held that the Board was an agency of the State of Pennsylvania.
Therefore, its refusal to admit Negroes because of their race was discrimination, in violation of the fourteenth amendment, even though it
was acting as a trustee. "
This holding seems to be in line with the statement in Shelley v.
Kraemer that "State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all
its forms."'"
CONCLUSION

The court in the Girard case found state action in the acts of the
trustee, but might it not go further and find state action in the judicial
determination of whether the trust is charitable, in construing ambigious
language, probating the will, or in legislation creating and defining charitable trusts, regulating the trustees, and bestowing tax immunity?" If,
as suggested by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania," a private trustee
of the Girard trust is substituted for the present trustee and the case
should again come up for review, the United States Supreme Court
might .well be confronted with this issue. This issue was presented in
argument before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court along with the issue
34 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, supra note 33.
35 64 Pa. 169 (1870).
36 Act of June 30, 1869, P.L. 1276, 53 P.S. §§ 6481-6486.
37 In
re Girard's Estate, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956), rev'd per curiam, 353 U.S.
230 (1957), rehearing den., 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
38 4 D. & C.2d 671.
(Orph. Ct. Philadelphia).
39 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
40 334 U.S. at 20.
4' Charitable Trusts, 66 Yale L.J. 979. See also, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at
22: "And it would appear beyond question that the power of the State to create and
enforce property interests must be exercised within the boundaries defined by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Contra, Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87
N. E.2d 541 (1949).
Stuyvesant town was built pursuant to a contract between the
City of New York and Stuyvesant Town Corp., a subsidiary of Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., organized as a redevelopment company under the New York redevelopment companies law.
This law provides that the municipality may take
property by condemnation for a redevelopment company and may exempt the
company from local and municipal taxes. The contract in this case included these
benefits. Negro plaintiffs were refused apartments in the finished project because of
their color and sued to enjoin such discrimination. It was held that the aids that the
state provided the defendants and the controls that they were subject to were not
sufficient to transform their conduct into state action violating the fourteenth
amendment. This was merely private action which was recognized as valid in Shelley
v. Kraemer. Three judges dissented.
42 In re Girard's E]state, 386 Ps. 548, 127 A.2d 287, 295 (1956)
(concurring opinion).

SACHS-LAELOR- (ORPORATIOn SEAL5- ALPInE 5-3422

MAY-JUNE,

1958

DICTA

of state action by the trustee.'3 It was emphasized in a concurring
opinion. The author-recognizing that the fourteenth amendment prohibits discrimination because of race, creed, or color-was fearful that
such an extension of the state action concept would have a catastrophic
effect on testamentary church and charitable bequests." Although the
guarantee of freedom to worship under the first amendment would
probably temper the effects of the author's fears, his opinion points out
the possible extremes to which such a rule could extend."'
What will be the effect of the Girard case on other similar charitable
trusts? For example, look at the Clayton College trust. The history of
this trust parallels that of the Girard trust. The will of George W. Clayton reads:
"I do hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto the Corporation of the City of Denver, in trust never-the-less, to be devoted
solely and exclusively to the founding, establishing and forever
maintaining a permanent college within the City of Denver, in
the County of Arapahoe and State of Colorado, for the better
education, and more comfortable maintenance than they usually
receive from the application of public funds, of poor, white male
orphan children, somewhat on the plan of Girard College, in
the City of Philadelphia and State of Pennsylvania .. .""
Legislation was enacted specifically authorizing the city to act as a trustee and Ordinance No. 110, Series of 1910, City and County of Denver set
up the George W. Clayton Trust Commission. The Colorado Supreme
Court has referred to the George W. Clayton Trust Commission as the
proper and appropriate "agency of the municipality" in charge of the
trust estate." These facts would seem to put the Clayton Trust well
within the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Girard
case" and render it vulnerable to an attack based on state action in violation of the equal protection provision of the fourteenth amendment.
The present attitude of the Colorado Supreme Court is apparently favorable to such an attack."
Judicial acceptance of the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer has been
slow and painful, not an immediate acclamation as predicted by the
43 In re Girard's Estate, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287, 325 (dissenting opinion). The
petitioners contended that the Girard trust was a public charity and as such subject
to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.
44 In re Girard's Estate, supra note 42. "If the present contention of the city is
correct, its effect will be catastrophic on testamentary church and charitable bequests,
as well as on the law of wills in Pennsylvania-the Fourteenth Amendment-is not
confined to color; it prohibits states from making any discrimination because of race,
creed or color. It follows logically and necessarily that if an individual cannot constitutionally leave his money to an orphanage or to a private home or college for
poor white male orphans, he cannot constitutionally leave his money to a Catholic,
or Episcopal, or Baptist, or Methodist, or Lutheran or Presbyterian Church; or to a
Synagogue for Orthodox Jews; or to a named Catholic Church or to a named Catholic
priest for Masses for the repose of his soul, or for other religious or charitable purposes. That would shock the people of Pennsylvania and the people of the United
States more than a terrible earthquake or a large atomic bomb."
45 But see Gordon v. Gordon. 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 229 (1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 947 (1955). Judicial enforcement of a will which revoked a gift to any child
who should marry a person not born in the Jewish faith did not contravene the first
or fourteenth amendments because it did not establish a condition based on belief
at the time of marriage. Shelley v. Kraemer and Brown v. Board of Education were
distinguished.
46 Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 234, 70 Pac. 429 (1902).
47 Estate of Clayton, City and County of Denver, Trustee v. Park Hill Golf Club,
127 Colo. 592, 259 P.2d 617 (1953).
48 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
49 See Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Smith, 316 P.2d 252 (1957).
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writers. However, the trend seems to be toward broadening the rule to
prohibit state action in any form from aiding private discrimination."
The Colorado court has taken the lead in adopting the broad doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer and it is probable that other states will follow suit as the cases arise. The judicial climate seems favorable to such
development in view of recent pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in other areas involving equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 51
50 Cf. Pritchett, Civil

Liberties and the Vinson Court, 145. "All in all, the liberal

record of the Vinson Court in

racial discrimination

cases stands out in

sharp con-

trast to the generally antilibertarian trend of its decisions in other fields. Moreover,
a comparison of the 1948 and 1953 restrictive covenant decisions . . . reveals a progressively developing boldness in the handling of discrimination issues."
51 See Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957);
Brown v. Board of Educaton, 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
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CASE COMMENTS
Criminal Law-Driving While IntoxicatedFarm Tractor Held Vehicle
By E. R.

ARCHAMBEAU,

JR.

E. R. Archambeau, Jr. is a registered professional engineer who received his B.S.
degree from Texas Technological College in 1949 and his M.S. from the University of Illinois in 1950. At present, he is a student in the University of Denver
College of Law.
The defendant was convicted of violating a statute prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle by an intoxicated person.' Appeal was taken
to the Supreme Court of Missouri on the ground that the farm tractor
he was driving was not a "motor vehicle" within the purview of the
statute. Attorneys for the appellant urged that a farm tractor was not
a motor vehicle since tractors were exempted from statutes dealing with
registration requirements and motor vehicle safety responsibility regulations. The court rejected this argument because, while those statutes
specifically exempted tractors, the statutes further specified tractors must
comlply with all other vehicular regulations. The court stated that it
was obviously the intent of the legislature that tractors should be generally classified as motor vehicles. If tractors are not motor vehicles, why
should it be necessary to exclude them specifically from some regulations
concerned only with motor vehicles? It was held that a farm tractor is a
notor vehicle within the meaning of the "driving while intoxicated"
statute. State v. Powell, 306 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1957).
All states expressly prohibit intoxicated persons from driving either
a "motor vehicle" or else a "vehicle." Superficially, it seems obvious just
what a "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" is. But as simple and straightforward as these terms appear to be, they have been the subject of much
litigation. Generally the difficulties in interpreting these terms arise
in negligence and damage suits. A large number of contract and taxation claims also have involved the definition of these terms. Just
where has the line been drawn?
Motorcycles have been a popular subject of definition since their invention. In many suits involving insurance claims, it has been held
that a motorcycle is neither an automobile,- nor a motor-driven car,'
nor a horse-drawn vehicle.' Likewise, a motorcycle with a sidecar is
neither an automobile nor a motor-driven car.' Two contrary decisions,
one with a dissenting opinion, ruled that the indefinite terms of an accident policy would be interpreted in favor of the insured and that a
I Mo. Rev. Stat, § 564.440 (Vernon 1949).
2 Neighbors v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 Ark. 356, 31 S.W.2d 418 (1930); La Porte
v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 161 La. 933, 109 So. 767 (1926); Salo v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 257 Mass. 303, 153 N.E. 557 (1926); Moore v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 162
Tenn. 682, 40 S.W.2d 403 (1931).
3 Perry v. North American Ace. Ins. Co.. 104 N.J.L. 117, 138 Atil. 894 (1927); Anderson v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 197 N.C. 72, 147 S.E. 693, 695 (i929); Deardorff v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 301 Pa. 179, 151 At. 814 (1930).
4 Perry v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., supra note 3.
M5Landwehr v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 159 Md. 207, 150 Atl. 732, 735 (1930);
lonald
v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 168 Tenn. 418. 79 S.W.2d 555 (1935).
Contra, Burrus
v. Continental Life Ins. Co.. 225 Mo. App. 1129, 40 S.W.2d 493 (1930).
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motorcycle was considered to be in the same category as automobiles
and motor-driven cars.' An early case, in which a motorcycle operator
was charged with frightening a team of horses, also held that a motorcycle was to be considered a motor vehicle."
Animal-drawn devices, such as a horse-drawn road grader,' a mowing machine,' and a threshing machine," have been held to be vehicles.
However, a wagon pulled by a dog is not a vehicle." A horse-drawn
wagon is not a motor vehicle," but is subject to inclusion in statutes
prohibiting driving while intoxicated." A saddle horse, which the insured was riding," and a mule unattached to a conveyance" were found
not to be vehicles. However, it has been decided that horses are vehicles
within the meaning of a statute requiring vehicles on highways to carry
lights after dark." Two similar cases concerning accidents involving
policemen's horses decided that a horse is not a vehicle," but was a
"facility of transportation.""
Motor vehicle statutes generally exclude human-powered devices
from the scope of their regulation. Bicycles have been frequent subjects
of controversy. They have been held not to be motor vehicles by implication," and specifically." Even though it has been settled for many
years that a bicycle is a vehicle," at least two cases have ruled that a person pushing a bicycle still has the rights of a pedestrian."
In by
accord
with "this,
it has
been sleds,"
decided and
thatcoaster
two-wheeled
pushed
a person,
a boy's
scooter,'
wagons" carts
are
not subject to motor vehicle regulations. However, in a town where the
local ordinances defined vehicles as including every mobile device except baby carriages and street cars, a boy's coaster wagon was thought to
be subject to vehicle regulations." Another case decided that although
6 Womack v. Life & Cas. Co., 184 So. 357 (La. Ct. App. 1938). It was held that
an enclosed motorcycle with a driver's cab and a storage compartment was a 'motor
truck' because it was used to make deliveries. Bolt v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 156 S.C.
117, 152 S.E. 766, 770-71 (1930) (one judge dissented).
7 Bonds v. State, 16 Ga. App. 401, 85 S.D. 629, 631 (1915).
8 Sant v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 49 Idaho 691, 291 Pac. 1072, 1074 (1930).
The
court held that a horse-drawn road grader was a vehicle since the deceased was riding
on it to work, but did not pass on the status of such a grader in operation.
9 Trussell v. Ferguson, 122 Neb. 82, 239 N.W. 461, 463 (1931).
10 Vincent v. Taylor Bros., 180 App. Div. 818, 168 N.Y. Supp. 287 (3d Dep't 1917).
11 Jackson v. Hammersley, 72 Idaho 301, 240 P.2d 829, 832 (1952).
12 Bandos v. Philadelphia, 304 Pa. 191, 155 Atl. 279 (1931).
13 State v. Stewart, 57 Ariz. 82, 111 P.2d 70, 71 (1941).
14 Riser v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 207 Iowa 1101, 224 N.W. 67 (1929).
15 State ex rel. Almon v. One Black Horse Mule, 207 Ala. 277, 92 So. 548 (1922).
16 Conrad v. Dillinger, 176 Kan. 296, 270 P.2d 216, 218 (1954).
17 Douglass v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 717, 41 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1st Dep't 1943).
's Bernardine v.
City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
19 Bank for Savings & Trusts v. United States Cas. Co., 242 Ala. 161, 5 So. 2d 618
(1942).
20 Niedzinski v. Coryell, 215 Mich. 498, 184 N.W. 476 (1921); Taylor v. United Traction Co., 184 Pa. 465, 40 Atl. 159 (1898).
21 Molway v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 486, 88 N.E. 485 (1909); Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind.
450, 20 N.E. 132, 134 (1889); Thomas v. Dahi, 293 Ky. 808, 170 S.W.2d 337, 338 (1943);
Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555, 60 N.W. 545 (1894); Thompson v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 357 Pa. 3, 53 A.2d 120 (1947); State v. Collins, 16 R.I. 371, 17 At]. 131
(1888).
22 Holmes v. Blue Bird Cab, 227 N.C 581, 43 S.E.2d 71 (1947); Benson v. Anderson,
129 Wash. 19, 223 Pac. 1063 ('1924).
23 Gallardo v. Luke, 33 Cal. App. 2d 230, 91 P.2d 211 (1939); People v. Weinberger,
165 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1957); Lewis v. Watson, 229 N.C. 20, 47 S.E.2d 484
(1948); Flaumer v. Samuels, 4 Wash. 2d 609, P.2d 484 (1940).
24 Jermane v. Forfar, 108 Cal. App. 2d 849, 240 P.2d 351, 354 (1952).
25 Illingworth v. Madden, 125 Me. 159, 192 AtI. 273, 276 (1937); Idell v. Day, 273 Pa.
34, ,116 Atl. 506, 507 (1922).
Contra, Long v. Hicks, 173 Wash. 17, 21 P.2d 281 (1933)
(statute included sleds in definition of vehicles).
26 Wright v. Salzberger & Sons, 81 Cal. App. 690. 254 Pac. 671, 676 (1927).
27 Hattie v. Shaheen, 37 Ohio App. 50, 174 N.B. 20 (1930); cf. Spears Dairy v.
Bohrer, 54 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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a horse-drawn sleigh was subject to vehicle regulations, a coaster sled
was not.'
Miscellaneous items considered not to be vehicles include ferry boats,"
wheel chairs,"0 and elevators. 1 A potato digger towed by a tractor is
an "implement of husbandry" and not a vehicle." It was decided that
a front-end loader was not a vehicle and therefore was not subject to attachment of a mechanics' lien." However, a motorized carry-all for hauling dirt was a vehicle and subject to vehicular registration requirements.' Towed pavement finishers are not subject to vehicle regulations, " but motorized road graders' and fork-lift trucks "' are motor
vehicles.
A novel case, in which the plaintiff's deceased husband was shot
while walking down the street, held that a pistol bullet, though moved
or carried by compressed gases, was not a vehicle as considered by an
insurance policy covering accidental death caused by any vehicle."
It has been decided that airplanes are not motor vehicles under the
guest statute,3" automobile accident policies," the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,'" negligence cases,'" or statutes requiring the recording
of chattel mortgages on all items except vehicles.'" However, an airplane is a motor vehicle within the Tariff Act of 1930" and the Mississippi Motor Carrier Regulatory Act of 1938."
Trolley busses," street cars," and trains" are usually held not to
be motor vehicles either because they are not self-powered or because
they run on fixed rails or tracks. Apparently trailers occupy an uncertain status. Some have been considered motor vehicles when connected
to a towing vehicle," but some trailers have been held not to be motor
vehicles even when towed."
Tractors have had their day in court before the instant case. In
insurance claim suits, it has been decided that a farm tractor was not
28 Terrill v. Virginia Brewing Co., 130 Minn. 46, 153 N.W. 136 (1915).
29 Duckwall v. City of New Albany, 25 Ind. 283, 286 (1865).
30 Stevenson v. United States Express Co., 221 Pa. 59, 70 AtI. 275 (1908).
31 Wilson v. C. Dorflinger & Sons, 218 N.Y. 84, 112 N.E. 567 (Ct. App. 1916).
32 Turner v. Purdum, 77 Idaho 130, 289 P.2d 608, 613 (1955).
33 Wilson v. Robert A. Stretch, Inc., 44 N.J. Super. 52, 129 A.2d 599, 603 (1957).
34 People v. Pakchoian, 114 Cal. App. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 767 (1952).
35 Fitzpatrick v. Service Const- Co., 227 Mo. App. 1074, 56 S.W.2d 822, 824 (1933).
36 Peterson v. King County, 199 Wash. 106, 90 P.2d 729 (1939).
37 National Gas. Co. v. Thompson, 96 So. 2d 708 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957).
3' Scott v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 1S So. 2d 58 (La. Ct. App. 1944).
39 In re Hayden's Estate, 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813, 817 (1953); Hanson v. Lewis,
5 Ohio Supp. 195, 1938 U.S. Av. R. 73 (1937).
40 Monroe's Adm'r. v. Federal Union Life Ins. Co., 251 Ky. 570, 65 S.W.2d 680, 682
(1933).
41 MeBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
42 Rich v. Finley, 325 Mass. 99, 89 N.E.2d 213, 218 (1949).
43 DiGuilio v. Rice, 27 Cal. App. 2d, 70 P.2d 717 (1937).
'4 United States v.
One Pitcairn Biplane, 11 F. Supp. 24 (W.D.N.Y. 1935).
45 South Mississippi Airways v. Chicago & Southern Airlines, 200 Miss. 329, 26 So.
2d 455, 461 (1946).
46 City of Dayton v. De Brosse, 62 Ohio App. 232, 23 N.E. 2nd 647, 650 (1939).
47 Chicago v. Keogh, 291 Ill. 188, 125 N.E. 881 (1919).
48 Grover v. Sharp & Fellows Contracting Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 515, 186 P.2d 682,
685 (1947).
49 See, e.g., Vest v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E.2d 105 (1952); Kern v. Con(dictum).
tract Cartage Co., 55 Ohio Ct. App. 481, 9 N.E.2d 869, 875 (1936)
50 See, e.g., Miller v. Berman, 55 Cal. App. 2d 569, 131 P.2d 18 (1942); Liberty
Highway Co. v. Callahan, 24 Ohio Ct. Ap. 174, 157 N.E. 708, 712 (1926); Hennessy v.
Walker, 279 N.Y. 94, 17 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1938).
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covered by a fire insurance policy on automobiles"' or an automobile liability policy." On the other hand, an accident policy covering mishaps
due to fire or vehicles was found to include damages caused by a bulldozer tractor knocking down a building." Also, an accident policy excluding motorcycles and aerial devices was considered to cover accidents
on a farm tractor.' An accident caused by a logging tractor was covered
by an accident policy excluding motorcycles and farm machinery." A
"
farm tractor was found subject to state sales taxes on motor vehicles,
"
and tractors were also held to be subject to motor vehicle fuel taxes.
It has been held that tractors are considered motor vehicles requiring
mufflers."
The most commonly accepted definition of a vehicle includes every

device except those moved by human power or used exclusively upon
stationary rails or tracks." Some statutes" prohibiting the driv;ng of

"any vehicle" while intoxicated expressly state that, for the purposes of

the statute defining certain vehicle offenses, persons riding bicycles"
or riding, or leading, or driving an animal" shall be subject to all provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle. The Colorado statute includes both bicyclists and drivers of animal-drawn vehicles."

It is of

interest that some states, in which it is prohibited to drive "any motor vehicle" while intoxicated, have expressly exempted farm tractors and some
other devices from their statutory definitions of motor vehicles."

Despite these variations in application and definition, very few
cases concerned with driving while intoxicated have been carried into
the appellate courts. Two cases where the main issue was the definition
of "motor vehicle" were appealed on the ground that steering a car
while being pushed or towed did not constitute operator of a motor
vehicle." Another case was appealed on the question of whether or not
a pickup truck was a motor vehicle as defined by the statute." However,
all three convictions were sustained by the higher courts.
It is axiomatic that criminal statutes are construed strictly. However,
decisions from many states have held that statutes prohibiting operation
of motor vehicles while intoxicated should be liberally construed so
51 Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952).
52 Bowers v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 166, 5 P.2d 608 (1931); Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Burke, 258 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Ky. 1953); Brown v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
241 N.C. 666, 86 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1955).
3 Golding-Keene Co. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 96 N.H. 64, 69 A.2d 856, 859
(1949).
54 Koser v. American Cas. Co., 162 Pa. Super. 63, 56 A.2d 301 (1948).
55 Johnson v. Continental Cas. Co., 127 Mont. 281, 263 P.2d 551 (1953).
56 Burford-Toothaker Tractor Co. v. Curry, 241 Ala. 350, 2 So. 2d 420 (1941).
57 State v. Louisiana Oil Corp., 174 Miss. 585, 165 So. 423 (1936).
58 Johnson v. Bergquist, 184 Minn. 576, 239 N.W. 772 (1931).
(1953). "Vehicle, every device in, upon or
59 E.g., Colo. 'Rev. Stat. § 13-1-1 (1)
by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public
power or used exclusively upon stationby
human
highway, excepting devices moved
ary rails Or tracks."
60 Boyd, An Analysis of the Drunken Driving Statutes in the United States, 8
Vand. L. Rev. 888, 892-93 (1955) is an excellent article which gives the wording of
each state's statute.
61 E.g., North Carolina.
62 E.g., Arizona, Georgia. and Oregon.
"Every person riding a bicycle or driving
63 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-5 (1) (1953).
any animal drawing a vehicle upon a roadway shall be subject to the provisions of
except those provisions of this article
of
a
vehicle,
driver
to
the
applicable
this article
which, by their nature, can have no application."
64 E.g., Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.
65Chamberlain v. State, 294 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956); Rogers v. State,
147 Tex. Crim. 602, 183 S.W.2d 572 (1944).
364, 242 S.W.2d 396 (1951).
66 Nichols v. State, 156 Tex. Crin.
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that the public may be protected while on the highways.' 7 It,
is obvious
from the opinions in these and other cases that the judiciary intends to
protect the public as far as possible from the dangers of intoxicated
drivers.
What has Colorado done to protect the public from these hazards?
The Colorado statute appears to be as strict and inclusive as that of any
other state. Colorado statutes prohibit driving while intoxicated of
"any vehicle" upon the highways and "elsewhere through the state.""
The statutory definition of "vehicle" excludes only devices moved by
human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. " Motor
vehicles include every self-propelled vehicle" with all types of tractors"
being specifically designated as motor vehicles. As mentioned before,
Colorado expressly includes bicyclists and drivers of animal-drawn vehicles in the applicable sections."2
Indicative of what Colorado's stand probably would be in this matter is the decision handed down in an interesting case brought before
the Colorado Supreme Court several years ago. People v. Rapini," involving an issue similar to the instant case, was concerned with a violation of the state statute prohibiting the use of vehicles with metal cleats
on state highways. The defendant alleged that the offending machine,
a binder, did not violate the statute since it was not a vehicle, but in-

stead was an "instrument of husbandry." The court granted that the
binder was an instrument of husbandry, but held that it was also a
vehicle within the meaning of the statute.
Should a case on all fours with Powell v. State be brought before the

Colorado courts, it is likely that a conviction for driving a vehicle while
intoxicated would be sustained. The plrosecLtion could rely upon the
statute as written with little difficulty.
67 See, e.g., State v. Mann, 143 lie. 305. 61 A.2d 786 (1948); People v. Rue, 166
Misc. 845, 2 N.Y.S.2d 939, 942 (City Ct. of Middletown 1938); Luellen v. State, 64 Okla.
Crim. 382, 81 P.2d 323 (1938).
68 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-30 (1) (Supp. 1955) (driving while intoxicated statute).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-1 (2) (1953). declares that the penalty sections, including those
for driving while intoxicated, apply upon the highways and elsewhere through the
state.
69 See note 59 supra.
70Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-1 (2) (1953). "Motor vehicle, every vehicle, as herein
defined, which is self-propelled."
71 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-1 (6), (7) (1953).
72 See note 63 supra.
73 107 Colo. 363, 112 P.2d 551 (1941).
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Mines and Minerals-Discovery-ScientificDiscovery of
Uranium Ore

By

GERALD STARBUCK

Gerald Starbuck received both his B.S. in Business Administration and his B.S. in
Engineering from the University of Colorado in 1953. Ha is a student at the
University of Denver College of Law.
On February 27, 1955, the defendants, while prospecting on state
land, detected with a geiger counter a radioactive count of four or five
times the normal background count. There was evidence that the defendants obtained geiger counter readings at four points, posted four
notices, and dug four discovery pits. A sample was taken from one of the
pits and a chemical assay disclosed 1.24 percent uranium and 0.4 percent
vanadium. On April 4, 1955, the plaintiffs secured from the State Board
of Land Commissioners a mining lease to a half section of land which
included the defendant's four claims. In an ejectment action brought
by the plaintiffs, the defendants claimed a portion of the land by alleging
valid prior lode mining locations under state law.' In the trial court the
issue narrowed down to the validity of the initial discovery and a
judgment was entered for the defendants. The Colorado Supreme Court,
affirming the trial court, held that, when the controversy is between two
mineral claimants, the statutes requiring discovery should be liberally
construed. The court further held that where, as in a group of contiguous claims lying in similar ground, competent radiometric readings
coupled with an assay disclose mineral in place on at least one of the
claims, similar radiometric findings on the other claims would constitute valid discoveries within the meaning of the statute if such other
discoveries are "capable of competent radiometric delineation in similar
rock in place or along the same vein or lode."' A dissenting opinion felt
the decision was revolutionary in the field of mineral law and pointed
out that geiger counters could not distinguish between mineralized rock
in place and mineralized rock in float or wash. Dallas v. Fitzsimmons,
323 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1958).
Prior to this Colorado decision two other state supreme courts had
faced the question of the validity of discoveries made with geiger counters or scintillators and a split of authority had evolved.
In a 1958 Utah case the defendant offered evidence that ore bodies
had been found in strata on both sides of his claims and that one of
these ore bodies was supporting a producing mine.' He also showed
that certain channeling of a type along which uranium is often found
ran through his claims and on these claims favorable geiger counter
readings had been obtained. The court upheld the claims and stated
that it was perfectly legitimate to rely on radiometric indications as one
of the means for locating uranium. It further stated that, in testing the
validity of a discovery, consideration may be given not only to the mineral found, but also to the geology of the area, the locations of other ore
bodies or mines in the area, the opinions of experts, and any other information which miners regard as having an influence upon the possibility
' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 112-3-42 (1953).
2 Dallas v. Fitzsimmons, 323 P.2d 274, 279 (Colo.
3 Rummel v. Bailey, 320 P.2d 653 (Utah 1958).

1958).
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of developing a mine, and in the case of uranium, the geiger counter
may be considered.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in 1957 was faced with a fact situation similar to that of the main case." In the Wyoming case, the plaintiff
staked ten adjoining claims in an area showing radiometric readings
of two to seven times the normal background count. From three of these
claims samples were taken from rock in place and assays of these samples
showed the presence of uranium. The defendants subsequently staked
claims on the same ground. The court recited that to establish a valid
location of a mining claim there must be a discovery of valuable mineral
in a lead, lode, ledge, vein, or rock in place. It stated that on seven of the
claims there had been no sampling or assaying and therefore no discovery of mineral in place. The court refused to recognize the readings of
scintillators or geiger counters as sufficient to support discovery stating
that such readings could not be depended upon as the only test, for in
some areas these instruments would give indications of a high background count yet assay would show no uranium. Judgment allowed the
plaintiff only the three claims which had been sampled and assayed:
In a recent Colorado case involving uranium mining claims, the
validity of discovery was not an issue, but the Colorado Supreme Court
discussed at some length the problems facing the courts in attempting to
apply mining laws developed years ago to modern controversies over
lands containing uranium ore.' There it was explained that one of the
most successful ways of discovering secondary uranium ore bodies where
no outcrops are visible is with the use of radio detecting instruments.
It was pointed out that uranium ore bodies are often subject to thick
layers of overburden and that, although radiometric readings above the
normal may be -found on the surface, yet no single piece of rock picked
up from the surface will react or give a count. This phenomenon has resulted in the practice among prospectors of staking claims over a large
area when a radiometric anomaly is found. Notices are posted and location certificates filed with the hope of establishing subsequent legal
discoveries to validate the claims before intervening rights have arisen.
The court recognized that no legislation had been enacted expressly
providing for valid discoveries by radio detection and this was attributed
to fear of inoperative or defective instruments,' mistakes, and the fact that
radioactive ore bodies are far from consistent in their response to the various instruments. Some deposits of uranium are in balance and either
do not give a count or give one entirely different from that to be expected when compared to assayed samples taken from the same area.
The court terminated this discussion by stating that chemical assay was
the conclusive test.
The problem of defining the requirements for discovery is by no
means a new one. The general rule, which evolved from the early mining
days, is that, where minerals have been found and the evidence is of such
4 Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 318 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1957).
5 Smaller v. Leach, 316 P.2d 1030 (Colo. 1957) (dictum). See also Waldeck, Discovery Requirements and Rights Prior to Discovery on Uranium Claims on the Colorado Plateau, 27 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 404 (1955); Note, 4 Utah L. Rev. 239 (1954).
6 Note, 9 Wyo. L. J. 214 (1955).
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character that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the
further expenditure of his labor and means, the requirements of the
statute have been met.'
In 1865, the manner of locating lode claims in Colorado was governed by the rules and customs of the miners and they all recognized
discovery, followed by appropriation, as the foundation to the discoverer's title.8 However, the enactment of the statutes requiring the discoverer to sink a discovery shaft upon the lode to show a well defined
crevice within sixty days from initial discovery tended to reduce the importance of initial discovery.' This was evidenced in a decision which
held that the mere discovery of some other vein within the limits of the
claim would not supply the requirement of the discovery to be exposed
in the discovery shaft." Initial discovery coupled with notice properly
made and posted became an appropriation of the claim for a period of
sixty days." During that time a discovery shaft was to be dug and the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the shaft must show a well defined
crevice containing mineral bearing rock in place." This rule of discovery
has been somewhat more restrictive than the general rule as construed
by the federal courts and states not requiring discovery shafts."
In 1955, legislation was enacted in Colorado enabling claim locators
to submit a map prepared in a prescribed manner in lieu of sinking
the discovery shaft." Thus, today, if a locator elects to submit the map
instead of digging a discovery shaft, the validity of his initial discovery
becomes of primary importance in establishing his rights within the
statute. It is of interest to note that in Dallas v. Fitzsimmons the court
cited federal authority in defining the requirements for initial discovery," indicating possible attachment to the general rule.
Dallas v. Fitzsimmons represents a forward step in reconciling modern prospecting and locating practices to the requirements of the law.
By requiring at least one assay to substantiate radiometric discoveries
on a number of adjacent lode claims, the Colorado Supreme Court has
insured against many of the shortcomings of radio detecting instruments
and the unpredictable physical characteristics of uranium ore deposits,
and at the same time has given locators more latitude in establishing
enough claims to warrant a mining operation. On the other hand, problems still exist where the deposit lies beneath several hundred feet of
overburden and the obtaining of a sample for assay is a difficult and expensive matter. However, the decision appears to be a reasonable one
enhancing the probability of development of public lands and offering
protection to the rights of bona fide locators of uranium deposits.
Crisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905); Pitcher v. Jones, 71 Utah 453, 267 Pac. 184
(1928).
s Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527 (1885); Consolidated Republic Min. Co. v. Lebanon
Min. Co., 9 Colo. 343, 12 Pac. 212 (1886).
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 92-22-6, 92-22-9 (1953).
10 Beals v. Cone, 27 Colo. 473, 62 Pac. 948 (1900).

11 Sierra Blanca Mining and Reduction Co. v. Winchell, 35 Colo. 13, 83 Pac. 628
(1905).
12 Bryan c. McCaig, 10 Colo. 309, 15. Pac. 413 (1887).

13 See note 8 supra.
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 92-22-6 (Supp. 1955).
15 Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co., 98 Fed. 673 (1899).
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Securities-SecuritiesAct of 1933-Purchaserof Securities
As Underwriter
By LEON A.

ALLEN, JR.

Leon A. Allen Jr. received the degree of Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from
Cornell University in 1955. He is presently a student at the University of Denver
College of Law.
A corporation engaged in the publication of books and magazines
sold $4,000,000 principal amount of ten-yea- convertible debentures
without registering under the Securities Act of 1933 either the debentures
or the common stock into which they were immediately convertible.
The selling corporation acted in reliance upon exemptions from registration claimed under section 4 (1) of the Securities Act of 1933 as "trans-

actions by an issuer not involving any public offering."' Twenty-seven
purchasers, including four broker-dealer firms, were contacted privately
through the corporation's underwriter and subscribed to over $3,000,000
of the issue. These purchasers signed and submitted to the selling corporation an investment letter representing that the debentures were purchased for investment with no intention of distribution.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, after an investigation,
stated that the issue did involve a public offering and that no exemption
existedti under section 4 (1). The Commission maintained that the investment letter was signed by persons having no clear understanding of
its meaning and did not protect the issuer. Since the original purchaser
had acquired the debentures in order to convert them into common stock
which was then distributed to the public, the Commission held that
these purchasers were to be considered underwriters and registration by
the issuer was necessary. It was additionally stated that holding for the
six months' capital gains period of the tax statutes, holding in an "investment account" rather than a "trading account," holding for a deferred sale, holding for a market rise, holding for sale if the market does
not rise, or holding for a year, does not afford a statutory basis for exemption and should not be relied upon in issuing securities. The corporation then submitted a registration statement which the Commission
accepted. Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, SEC, Securities Act of
1933 Release No. 3825 (1957).
1 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1952).
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Shortly after the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, congressional and administrative study evolved some early interpretations of the
statutory definition of an underwriter.' The House of Representatives
committee studying the matter had this to say about the definition:
"The term is defined broadly enough to include not only
the ordinary underwriter who for a commission promises to see
than an issue is disposed of at a certain price, but also includes
as an underwriter the person who purchases an issue outright
with the idea of then selling that issue to the public."'
The theory upon which future decisions would be based was outlined by the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 19352 His opinion maintained that if the original purchaser had
purchased with the intent of distributing the securities, he would be an
underwriter and sales by a dealer of securities bought by him from the
initial purchaser would generally not be exempt until at least a year
after the purchase of the securities by the dealer. He also noted that
the size and manner of the offering should be considered. It has been
judicially affirmed that the burden of the proof of exemption falls upon
the party claiming the exemption.'
The first important administrative decision on this interpretation
held that the president of a corporation who received securities from the
15 U.S.C. § 77b (1952).
3 H.R. Comm. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1934).
2

4 Securities Act Release No. 285 (1935).
5 SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 193).
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corporation and resold in appreciable volume to the public was an underwriter, even though he received no price differential and was not treated
differently from the other stockholders.' In a subsequent ruling the
Commission held that a firm was an underwriter where it had loaned
money to an individual to enable him to exercise an option to buy the
issuer's stock and the firm was to share in the profits and risks of the
undertaking. The general question was considered of sufficient importance for the Commission to issue a release interpreting the definition to
exclude persons who purchase for investment unsold securities at a discount from the original underwriters.8 The opinion considered the intention of the purchaser at the time of purchase the crucial point and
held that this intention was a question of fact. For example, if the purchaser was a professional securities broker, the inference might be that
the securities were purchased with a view towards distributing them.
This rule was later applied by the Commission in holding that changed
circumstances could permit resale without the seller being classed as
an underwriter.!
A further expansion of the definition occurred in 1941 when a
court of appeals held, in reversing a district court, that there did not
have to be a fiduciary or other contractual relationship between the
issuer and underwriter." A Chinese benevolent association gratuitously
promoting and assisting in the sale of bonds of the Republic of China
was thus held to be an underwriter. The Commission received added
support for its position when the Supreme Court held in SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co." that the Commission was under no duty to use any specific
numerical test in determining whether a public offering existed. Although the court did not consider the position of the purchaser, it may
be inferred that it would similarly support the Commission's refusal to
delineate specific requirements for an underwriter.
In its latest decision the Commission categorically denies that any
of the usual tests as to the private offering purchaser can be used to completely exclude him from being labeled an underwriter. The investment letter and the holding of securities for a year had previously been
6 Kinner Airplane and Motor Corp., 2 S.E.C. 943

(1937).

7 Sweet's Steel Co., 4 S.E.C. 689 (1939).

Securities Act Release No. 1862 (1938).
9 Comstock-Dexter Mines, Inc., 10 S.E.C. 358 (1941).
10 SEC v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.
11 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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relied upon as a fairly reliable protection against the terms of the statute.
It is now evident that the Commission will not permit these safeguards
to be used as a positive defense." This is the first case to specifically hold
purchasers with no relationship to the issuer beyond the fact of purchase
as underwriters, although the possibility had always been present.
In the future, therefore, it will certainly continue to become more
difficult for an issuer to take advantage of exemptions within the
Securities Act. The Commission has been consistently upheld by the
Courts in its refusal to specify positive requirements for exemptions, and
it thus remains free to act in any case where it may feel that action is
necessary. This means that it will be very difficult for the issuer to determine if he may qualify under an exemption from the act. The extensive reliance on investment letters in the past may prompt issuers in
the future to revise the form of the letter to inform purchasers of the
Commission's interpretation of purchasing for distribution. Whether a
disclosure of this nature to initial purchasers will satisfy the Commission's requirements remains to be seen. If this form of letter is rejected
by the Commission, the difficulty of sustaining the burden of proof
that the securities have been acquired by initial purchasers for investment only, in the face of a possible subsequent resale, places a treacherous
obstacle in the path of the issuer. Counsel for the issuer must either
recommend that the securities be registered in all borderline cases, or lie
will be forced to sustain a very difficult proof of exemption in case the
Commission decides to act.
12 The Commission reiterated this positicn in suspension actions against three of
the broker-dealer firms involved in the Crowell-Collier issue. Securities Exchange Act
Releases No. 5688, 5689, 5690 (May 7, 1958).
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NEW DOCKET FEES INCOLORADO COURTS OF RECORD
The following chart shows present docket fees in Colorado
county, superior and district courts, as compared with the new fees
enacted by the legislature in House Bill 50. New fees take effect
July 1, 1958.

TYPE OF FEE

PRESENT FEE

NEW FEE

PLAINTIFF:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

$15.00
Domestic Relations (Any Court): ............................... $10.00
5.00
(If other than basic relief is granted)' ........................
15.00
Other District Court Actions: ...................................... 10.00
10.002
10.00
Other County and Superior Court Civil Actions: -----7.50
DEFENDANT District Court: .................................... 5.00
5.00
5.00
DEFENDANT County & Superior Court: -----------------10.00
.. ...................................................
A doption : . ..........
Probate: .......................................................... See Section 56-5-2 (H.B.50, § 8)
J.P. Appeal:
10.00
7.50
.................. ..................
Appellant:
5.00
5.00
A ppellee: ......................................................................
5.00
5.00
J.P. Transcript: ..........................................................
J.P. Certiorari:
10.00
..................................... 7.50
Applicant:
5.00
Respondent: .................................................................. 5.00
5.00
5.00
D ism issal For N o Com plaint: ---------------------------------------15.00
5.00
Rule 120 (Foreclosure): ................................................
.30/Folio
Record on Appeal: ........................................................ 20/Folio
.75/Page
.50/Page
2.50
1.50
Execution & Sheriff's Return: .................................
1.25
75
Cert. of Dismissal or no suit pending: ....................
1.25
.............................. 75
Cert. of Satisfaction: ..
.75
Acknowledgment of Deed: ............................................ 50
10.00
Crim inal D ocket Fee: ............................................... 10.00
15.00
Jury F ee: .......................................................................... 5.00

by John P. Moore and Robert Johnson,
of Denver College of Law.

* Prepared

both students at the University

1 An important change in the docket fee schedule is in the filing of an action in
relief
divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance wherein any other than basic
fee of five
(e.g., the payment of alimony or restraining orders) is sought; an additional
dollars is to be charged at the time of entry of such decree or order.

2 Notice that by providing for a lower docket fee in original filings in courts of
limited jurisdiction, the legislature has given tacit instructions that actions having
a claim for damages in the amount of two thousand dollars or less should be filed in
the court of that jurisdiction.
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